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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, MORAL LAW, AND THE
LEGAL DEFENSE OF LIFE IN A
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
A Constitutionalist Approach to the Encyclical
Evangelium Vitae
MARTIN RHONHEIMER"
I. INTRODUCrION: THE DEFENSE OF LIFE AND THE CHALLENGES OF A
"CULTURE OF DEATH"
The defense of human life in its physical integrity is, unquestionably, a
traditional duty of the state. This duty, however, is currently being
contested in two specific areas: the beginning and the end of life. The
encyclical Evangelium Vitae (1995) denounces the inhumanity of what it
calls a "culture of death": a culture within which killing becomes an
ordinary means to resolve conflict and end suffering, at times grievous and
tragic, and caused to a great extent by a remarkable irresponsibility within
the area of sexual behavior. The encyclical also appeals to the responsibility
of the state, the legislator, democratic institutions, and the people, so that
they continually guarantee a more effective safeguard of life, above all the
life of the weakest, including the unborn, the elderly, the handicapped, and
the terminally ill.'
In the following pages, I would like to show how the chapter in
Evangelium Vitae that discusses the relationship between moral and civil law
adopts a line of reasoning that could be called "constitutionalist." It follows
closely the reasoning already propounded in the document Donum Vitae
(1987) and in the encyclical Centesimus Annus (1991), which in its fifth
chapter proposes a conception founded on the basic principles of modem
constitutionalism: the idea of the supremacy of law over power; the
separation of powers; and the protection of individual freedom based on
fundamental rights. These are the constitutional presuppositions of a
democracy that seeks to avoid degenerating into a tyranny of the majority.
" An earlier version of this article appeared in Annales Theologici 9 (1995) 271-334.
The author would like to thank Paolo Carozza for translating the article and Gerard Bradley,
John Finnis, Donald Kommers, and David Tubbs for commenting on various aspects of it.
1. Evangelium Vitae, 90. Numerical references for Evangelium Vitae and the other
encyclicals cited within are to the section(s) of the encyclical. Quotations from Evangelium
Vitae are from the Vatican translation (St. Paul, Minn.: The Leaflet Missal Company, n.d.).
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I shall pay particular attention to the problems involving the legal
protection of prenatal human life; the principles developed there are only
partly applicable to the problem of euthanasia. Starting from the conviction
that mere moral argument is insufficient, this essay intends to propose a line
of reasoning that can insert the doctrine of Evangelium Vitae into the real
legal-political context of today. So I shall begin with a short yet necessary
reflection on the difference between a strictly moral dimension and a legal-
political one (Part 11). Later we shall see whether and to what extent such
a distinction seems justified against the setting of traditional Christian
thought (Part II). Then we shall proceed to an exposition of the doctrinal
core of Evangelium Vitae on this subject (Part IV), and to a comparative
and critical analysis of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal
Republic of Germany and of the United States of America (Part V). This
analysis will yield criteria and categories for dealing appropriately with the
chosen subject. In Part VI, I will point out the main propositions in
opposition to the legal defense of the unbom, propositions which intend to
"neutralize" and render irrelevant the fundamental truths that the unborn
child is a human person and that with respect to human dignity, he or she
is equal to any other living person. Finally, in Part VII, starting from the
teaching of Evangelium Vitae on the subject, I shall propose two arguments
to show the fundamental nexus between the legal-political order and the
moral law within the area of my chosen subject, the legal defense of human
life.
II. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE LEGAL-POLITICAL PLANE AND THE
MORAL PLANE
To focus effectively on the question of the defense of life through
legislative action and perhaps even social assistance by the state, we must
recognize two well differentiated planes: the moral and the legal-political.
Evangelium Vitae deals not only with ethical but also with complex legal-
political themes. Addressing the relationship between the civil and the
moral law, it affirms that "the purpose of civil law is different and more
limited in scope than that of the moral law."2  Not only are there limits
regarding civil law, but the civil and the moral law have different tasks.
The moral and civil law are not subject to the same practical logic. Civil
law is saturated with a specific ethical-practical rationality within a specific
ambit.
Moral law-as "natural law" 3- is nothing other than the light of the
intellect or of practical reason, which orders the actions of individual human
beings toward happiness, the end of human life. The moral law simply
distinguishes what is good from evil within human actions. It comprises
2. Evangelium Vitae, 71.
3. See John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, 40-44.
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those principles that steer free and responsible human actions toward moral
virtue and toward the good which perfects the agent. It ensures that a
person perfects himself through his life and actions and becomes a just
person with well-ordered sentiments: self-controlled, strong, courageous,
and patient.
Legal-political logic is not alien to moral- law or practical moral
rationality, nor is it opposed to it. Nevertheless, what we could call its
"formal objective" is different: it tends to make it possible for people to
live in community. It tends, therefore, toward peace, freedom, and justice,
which principally means "equality in freedom." The main precondition for
reaching such goals is the security (conferred by the state) of being able to
survive without becoming the easy prey of the stronger or the more cunning.
That is why citizens grant to state authority a "monopoly of legitimate
violence" (in the words of Max Weber). Only the state may legitimately use
physical force or delegate such a right to specific persons or institutions.
Backed by coercive authority of the modem state, civil law guarantees
above all the survival and physical security of every person. This is the first
element of the common good, a necessary presupposition for any other good
that falls within the legislative competence of the state.
In summary, the moral law regulates the actions of the individual, aiming
at the goodness of one own's actions; civil law (positive constitutional, civil,
and penal law) instead regulates the relationship between individuals, aiming
at the common good. This does not mean that moral law and the individual
actions it regulates are not directed toward the good of others. Quite the
contrary. The just relationship with others (which is not the "common
good," but rather the "good of others") is an integral part of the goodness
expressed by the actions of each individual person. The moral law dictates
the corresponding behavior through its requirement that "my actions"--the
actions carried out by each person-be good, so that "I may be or become
just or good." Civil law, instead, seeks to regulate the relationship between
persons so that they may live together in peace, security, and freedom, and
so that among them may be established that justice which guarantees equal
freedom, both political and economic. Accordingly, civil law does not aim
at making men good, even if public legislative action certainly has great
responsibility to promote and favor the conditions and environment where
it may be possible to lead a life that is good, virtuous, and worthy of man.
Such diversity in task and logic between moral and civil law may
correspond to a different logic on the basis of which the two laws may
prohibit an action, such as induced abortion, or the suppression of the
embryo or fetus in the womb of the mother. The moral law-that is, the
moral reason which distinguishes good from evil-forbids such an action as
evil and unjust. It is a sin,. an act contrary to virtue, a crime against the
love of one's neighbor. The person who carries it out acts in an immoral
way, thus becoming a morally bad person. The moral law imposes duties so
as to make good every single moral agent.
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For example, the moral law prohibits all types of lies as actions contrary
to the virtue of justice. Civil law, instead, will forbid lying only insofar as
it is an action that harms the relationship among persons to the point of
threatening the social order and their living together in peace and security.
Hence, at the legal level, only lies and fraud in commercial relations (and
so forth) are forbidden and punished. This prohibition means that such an
action has a particular moral seriousness: an action that harms not only the
good of others but also the common good (the good of order, peace, and
security, as well as the existing trust among men) is morally more negative.
What is forbidden by civil law is in a moral sense very important, but the
converse is not necessarily true. What may appear morally relevant and
grave need not be regulated -solely for that reason by civil law; in other
words, it does not fall within the province of civil law to sanction moral
order with the coercive power of the state. The state is not the "executor
of the moral law": "to the unconditional duty to abstain in every case from
directly and intentionally killing an innocent person-that is, to the absolute
moral prohibition, without exception, of abortion-does not correspond an
identical unconditional duty of the state to prevent all killings."4
If civil law were to prohibit and even punish an action such as abortion,
it would do so not simply to impede an immoral act with the aim of leading
men through state authority to practice virtue, to become good, and to attain
happiness. It does so merely to protect the life of the one who, through
such an act, would be threatened by death and deprived of his or her right
to live. In addition, it would do so to protect an expectant woman from
possible pressure from her environment, for instance, from the father of the
baby, if he wanted to avoid the duty of paying child support. So the
reasons that will lead a legislator to take legislative measures will pertain to
the intrinsic nature of state authority: it would be for political reasons, in
the most inclusive and noble sense of the word (in a sense, however, not
contrary to "moral"5). Safeguarding human life through civil law-that is,
positive right-is a political task. The argument for justifying legislative
intervention in this field must necessarily be a political or legal-political
argument which, however, will imply a whole series of premises: biological,
anthropological, and ethical.
4. R. Spaemann, "Preface" to the German edition of Stephen D. Schwarz, Die verratene
Menschenwzirde.AbtreibungalsphilosophischesProblem (K6ln: Communio Verlagsgesell-
schaft, 1992) (originally published as: The Moral Question ofAbortion [Chicago: Loyola
University Press, 1990]). With these words, Spaemann corrects the position of Schwarz,
which is insufficiently developed on this point.
5. That is, in the sense of a specific "political ethics," which is "ethics," though not
"ethics" tout court, but rather that specific part of ethics which refers to human actions,
whose object is the common political good. The acts of institutions and public agents (e.g.
legislators) are also included. On this, see Martin Rhonheimer, "Perch una filosofia politica?
Elementi storici per una risposta,"Actaphilosophica 1 (1992) 233-263. This does not mean
that two different norms exist, one "moral" and the other "political," for the same act.
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M. THE FUNCrION OF THE CIvIL LAW: AN HISTORIcAL DIGRESSION
A. From Aristotle to the Patristic Tradition
The distinction between the moral level and the legal-political level
presupposes abandoning an "Aristotelian" vision of the function of the polls
and of civil law. To Aristotle, man finds his fulfillment in the state-not
the modem state, but the ancient polis, a community of life and law, of
culture and religion. For this Greek philosopher, the task of law is to lead
men to virtue. Aristotle believes that the purpose of the laws of the
polis-conceived, still in the Platonic tradition, as an educational enter-
prise-is to compel corrupt men to behave according to virtue under the
threat of punishment: "It is difficult to have a correct education in virtue
from one's youth if one is not reared under such laws."
Law is needed for everything, "even, in general, for life as a whole; as
a matter of fact, more people obey out of necessity than reason, and more
for punishment than for propriety."7 The law, then, with "coercive power
prescribes what is morally suitable."" Thus, we can understand why
Aristotle's Politics constitutes the very crown of his Ethics.9
So begins a whole tradition that understands the education of people in
moral virtue to be the function par excellence of civil law. This tradition
is still present in the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas, in whom, however,
it is possible to identify another trend of thought, which preexisted in
patristics, for instance in Saint Irenaeus, but above all in Saint Augustine.
It was precisely Christianity, with its typical dualism, that rendered
impossible the unitary conception of the Aristotelian ethics of the pols.
Saint Irenaeus asserts that the task of the state is nothing other than to
provide security under the threat of punishment: to prevent the big fish
from eating the small ones.'0 The image of the fish is not too far from
Hobbes's wolves. It is, however, Saint Augustine who finally includes the
temporal order in the level of "fallen" reality, and who reserves to the
Church the task of guiding men to salvation and moral integrity, while
entrusting to the State the task of taking care of temporal goods, the
foremost being peace among men. The civitas caelestis or the community
of believers in Christ, is not concerned with "quidquid in moribus, legibus,
6. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X, 9 1179 b 33-34.
7. Ibid., 1180 a 5-6.
8. Ibid., 1180 a 20 e25.
9. See M. Rhonheimer, "Perch6 una filosofia politica?" For the link between
Aristotelian ethics and politics, see my book Praktische Vernunf und Vernanftigkeitder
Praxis. Handlungstheorie bei Thomas von Aquin in ihrer Entstehung aus dem Problem-
kontext der aristotelischenEthik (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), 391 et seq. See also
Martin Rhonheimer, La prospettiva della morale. Fondamenti dell 'eticaflosofica (Roma:
Armando, 1994), 184 et seq.
10. Saint Irenaeus of Lyon, Adversus haereses, V, 24.
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institutisque diversum est, quibus pax terrena vel conquiritur vel tenetur."
Let the state, then, take care ofpax terrena and it will do so legitimately "si
religionem qua unus summus et verus Deus colendus docetur, non
impedit. ,,"
This relative indifference toward the legislative system of the state is
quite distant from what will develop later as "political Augustinianism"--a
program for integrating state power in an attempt to create a res publica
christiana, in which temporal power is in the service of the salvation of the
soul. 12
B. Saint Thomas Aquinas
Saint Thomas is totally immune from this last trend, which culminates in
the hierocratic theories of some curial canonists of the thirteenth century. 3
In Saint Thomas we encounter both the patristic and the Aristotelian
traditions, but also the very important tradition of Roman law, as well as
canon law with its propensity to limit law to the external realm.' 4 In a
formula that is clearly Augustinian, Saint Thomas asserts that "the end of
human law is temporal peacefulness in society, an end for which it is
sufficient that the law prevent those evils that may disturb the peaceful
conditions of society. It is instead the concern of divine law to lead men to
eternal happiness."' 5
Saint Thomas is aware that not everything that is regulated by divine law
can also be regulated by human law. This asymmetry, however, is not
necessarily a defect; it belongs instead to the order anticipated by eternal
law."'6 Nevertheless, human law must never approve what divine law
11. Saint Augustine, De CivitateDel, XIX, 17. See also Augustine's De LiberoArbitrio,
I, 5, 39: "Ea enim [positive human law] vindicanda sibi haec adsumit, quae satis sint
conciliandae paci hominibus imperitis et quanta possunt per hominem regi."
12. See H. X. Arquilliere, L 'Augustinismepolitique. Essai sur la formation des thgories
politiquesdu Moyen Age, 2nd ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1955); J. J. Chevalier, Storiadelpensiero
politico, Vol. I, 2nd ed. (Bologna: II Mulino, 1989), 256-280; R.W. and A.J. Carlyle, A
History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, 6 vols. (Edinburgh-London: William
Blackwood, 1903-1936) (1970 reprint).
13. M. Grabmann, Studien fiber den Einfluss der aristotelischenPhilosophie auf die
mittelalterlichenTheorien iiber das Verhidltnis von Kirche und Staat (Sitzungsberichte der
Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historischeAbteilung, 1934, Heft
2 ), (Mllnchen: Verlag der Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss./ C.H. Beck, 1934), 41-60; R.W. and A.J.
Carlyle, History of Mediaeval Political Theory, vol. II.
14. See Thomas Gilby, Principality and Polity: Aquinas and The Rise of State Theory
in the West (London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,1958), xxiii.
15. "Legis enim humanae finis est temporalis tranquillitas civitatis ad quem finem
pervenit lex cohibendo exteriores actus, quantum ad illa mala quae possunt perturbare
pacificum statur civitatis. Finis autem legis divinae est perducere hominem ad finem
felicitatis aeternae. . . ." Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 98, a. 1.
16. See ibid., I-Il, q. 93, a. 3, ad 3: "Unde hoc ipsum quod lex humana non se
intromittat de his quae dirigere non potest, ex ordine legis aeternae provenit."
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forbids." "Not regulating" and "not prohibiting" is not the equivalent of
"approving" or even commanding. From the moral viewpoint, imperfec-
tion-a deficient character-belongs to the very nature of human law. What
is morally "imperfect" may be optimal, and (more or less) perfect from a
legal-political point of view (therefore, also from the standpoint of political
ethics).
This is how Saint Thomas gives his celebrated formula according to
which civil law does not intend to suppress all human vices: "but only the
most serious ones, from which even the majority of men are able to abstain,
and above all those that harm others, without the prohibition of which the
preservation of society would not be possible-just as human law forbids
murder, theft, and similar things."'"
It seems evident that such an assertion is very far from the Aristotelian
spirit. Saint Thomas certainly does not deny that even civil law must
create an environment favorable to human virtue. But these conditions are
above all conditions of justice, of human interrelations, which constitute the
cornerstones for living a good life. Saint Thomas already distinguishes
peccatum from crimen;9 not everything which in conscience is sin can be
the subject of human legislation. That subject matter is limited to what may
be ordered for the common good of civil society
either in an immediate manner, as when something is established directly
for the common good, or in a mediated manner, that is, when something
is established by the legislator insofar as it is part of the good discipline
characteristic of citizens so that the common good of justice and peace
is preserved.20
The phrase "good discipline" refers to external behavior between persons,
a characteristic of the limitations and specificity of human law that does not
address simply the province of the goodness of men or of citizens, but rather
the conservation of peace and justice in the social order, the common good
of men living in society.
17. Ibid.: "Secus autem esset si approbaret ea quae lex aeterna reprobat."
18. Ibid. ".. . sed solum graviora, a quibus possibile est maiorem partem multitudinis
abstinere; et praecipue quae sunt in nocumentun aliorum, sine quorum prohibitionesocietas
humana conservari non potest, sicut lege humana prohibentur homicidia et furta et
huiusmodi" (I-II, q. 96, a. 2). See also II-II, q. 69, a. 2, ad 1: "multum secundum leges
humanas impunita relinquuntur quae secundum divinum iudicium sunt peccata, sicut patet in
simplici fornicatione"; ibid. q. 77, a. 1, ad 1: ".... lex humana non potuit prohibere quidquid
est contra virtutem, sed ei sufficit ut prohibeat ea quae destruunt hominum convictum."
19. Gilby, Principality and Polity, 175 et seq. Beginning with Thomas Hobbes, this
distinction will become crucial for criminal law.
20. "...sed solum de illis qui sunt ordinabiles ad bonum commune, vel immediate, sicut
cum aliqua directe propter bonum commune fiunt; vel mediate, sicut cum aliqua ordinantur
a legislatore, pertinentia ad bonam disciplinam, per quem cives informantur, ut commune
bonum iustitiae et pacis conservent" (Summa Theologiae, I-I, q. 96, a. 3).
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We must add, however, that neither the patristic-Augustinian tradition nor
the thought of Saint Thomas corresponds to a theoretically elaborated
differentiation in principle between an area of virtuous perfection of the
person and a more properly legal-political area. For Saint Augustine, the
limited character of the duty of any temporal authority is due to the transient
character of any reality of this world. Salvation and moral perfection are
the prerogative of the spiritual power of the Church: one becomes good and
saintly as a member of the civitas caelestis. According to Saint Thomas,
also, it is not the specific duty of human law to make men good, despite the
fact that for him social reality and state authority are "natural" and not a
consequence of original sin as they are for Saint Augustine. In the end, it
is a typically Christian reservation, echoing the principle of giving to Caesar
what is Caesar's and to God what is God's.
C. The Modern Conception of the State and Civil Law
The principle and the reservation just mentioned undergo a radicalization
and transformation in modem thought. Against the background of the
bloody ideological-religious conflicts of early modernity, an answer is
sought to the question of the rational basis for the sovereign power of the
state. The state is no longer conceived as a fact; rather, its existence
requires a logical, well-constructed justification that must simultaneously
clarify the duty and function of both the state and its legislative power.
The first answer, whose unquestionable proponent is Thomas Hobbes,
bases the legitimacy of the state on its ability to ensure the survival of the
individual: his right to live and prosper is guaranteed only if he can live in
security, if his neighbor is not an insidious wolf but a person with whom he
can live in trust. It is therefore necessary to transfer the right to self-defense
and recourse to violence to a sovereign above everyone. Thus, peace, the
first condition for a dignified and prosperous life assured by freedom, is
established through a pact of mutual and spontaneous renunciation of self-
defense, with the consequent submission to a sovereign authorized to defend
everyone's life and enforce the laws.2
In its fundamental traits, even though it is only a part of the truth, the
utilitarian logic of a pact for the mutual and spontaneous renunciation of
self-defense, as delineated by Hobbes, is still valid today. An essential part
of the civil behavior of a normal citizen can only be explained on the basis
of his willingness to submit to a civil power in exchange for a guarantee of
certain vital goods. He has renounced protecting them by himself for the
purpose of reaching in this way a more advantageous state in the long run.
Perhaps we do not realize that as citizens we have already internalized such
21. In addition to many other studies on the philosopher from Malmesbury, I take the
liberty of referring to my recent analysis: Martin Rhonheimer, La filosofia politica di
Thomas Hobbes: coerenza e contraddizionidi un paradigma (Roma: Armando, 1997).
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a logic, accustomed as we are to this renunciation of self-defense and to the
functioning of the institutions guaranteeing our security.
History soon provided evidence of the need to guarantee security not only
from the wolves that are other men, but also from the only remaining wolf:
the state with its institutions. Thus we come to the birth of a more nuanced
thought, represented by Locke and Montesquieu in line with the Anglo-
Saxon tradition of the rule of law. Rights of liberty-fundamental rights
directed to limiting the power of the state-are discovered, positively
guaranteed, and made capable of being claimed before a judge. It is the
birth of modem constitutionalism.
It is within this context that we must place today the question of the legal
defense of life, especially prenatal life. It is insufficient simply to underline
the immoral character of procured abortion, or of what is called "active
euthanasia," in order to establish the need for a corresponding legislative,
even penal, rule. We could then ask why the state must protect the life of
the unborn, when its abstention from taking any measure in that regard
would not constitute any threat to peaceful coexistence among men.
It is clear that according to basic principles, Thomistic as well as
Hobbesian, the law must repress and criminalize those sins that would be
harmful to peace among men. The logic of the modem, contractarian
tradition is decidedly utilitarian, and in this sense limited. It does not work
in those cases when we discriminate against a group of human beings-not
yet born or of a particular race or color-among whom, by definition, the
discriminators cannot ever be included.
It seems obvious that within the context of the principles stated, an
argument favorable to the legislative regulation of abortion takes on a
particular difficulty. In what sense is a human legislator competent to
prohibit an act that is undoubtedly sinful but that seems to disturb only
minimally the peaceful coexistence among men living in tranquillity, order,
and justice? We shall come back to this crucial problem later.
D. Civil Law and the Defense of the Unborn before the Contemporary
Age
It seems that within the premodern tradition, one can find scarce help in
addressing the problem just mentioned, since only two criteria were then
prevailing. One determines what was to be forbidden by civil law, that is,
those vices that make it impossible for men to live together. The other
criterion identifies iniquity, the intrinsic injustice of a law, the fact that the
law may command something contrary to natural or divine law, or that it
may impose excessively onerous obligations or burdens on citizens. Such
a "law" would be a form of violence rather than a law, and would give rise
144 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE (1998)
to an obligation to disobey.' These criteria do not, in principle, anticipate
the case of a possible legislative tolerance toward the practice of abortion.
Yet we cannot derive from the practice of abortion a legislator's duty to
repress it by law and to impose punishment for it. At least this is not
evident and requires a broader treatment of the question. 3
A second problem follows. Even if the moral verdict of Christian
tradition with respect to abortion was clear, usually it did not satisfactorily
distinguish between abortion and contraception. Under the influence of
Saint Augustine, both contraception and the killing of the fetus were
considered sins against one of the goods of marriage, the bonum prolis.24
The legal defense of the unborn through punishment by temporal authority
was almost never considered. In twelfth-century England, abortion cases
seem to have been delegated to ecclesiastical courts for trial. 5 The first
great European penal code to provide for a penalization of abortion was the
Constitutio Criminalis Carolina of 1532. It was difficult, however, to
prosecute abortion in court because of the lack of proof. One finds
convictions for infanticide, but rarely for procured abortion.26 Even in
English common law, under the influence of the theory of later quickening,
abortion as simple misprision (infraction or crime) was distinguished from
actual homicide. Only in the seventeenth century, with new scientific
discoveries, does awareness increase of the beginning of human life with
conception." This scientific progress is reflected in the first codifications
22. See Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 96, a. 4. We should also interpret I-Il, q. 93, ad 2
in this way.
23. Let us not forget that the idea of a state as the comprehensive ordering power,
obligated to safeguard the goods of the citizens and, moreover, with the possibility of unjust
legislative omissions, presupposes the concept and modem reality of the state.
24. Moreover, under the influence of Saint Augustine and the later decretal Si Aliquis,
medieval penitential practice treated as "murderers" both he who procured an abortion of a
"formed" fetus (i.e. animated with human life, after the fortieth day) and those who practiced
contraception because of lust, whereas it was considered less serious to procure the abortion
of a "non-formed" fetus (i.e. before the fortieth day from conception). Saint Augustine's
decisive text is De nuptiis et concupiscentiis, I, c. 15, n. 17 (CSEL: vol. 42, p. 230), taken
up again in the Sententiae by Peter Lombard, lib. iv, Dist. XXXI, cap. 3, and then
commented on throughout the Scholastic age. For the decretal Si Aliquis, see John T.
Noonan, Jr., Contraception: A History of its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and
Canonists, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), 168 ff.; 176 ff.
25. See John Keown, Abortion, Doctors, and the Law: Some Aspects of the Legal
Regulation of Abortion in England from 1803 to 1982 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1988), 5; D.J. Horan and T.J. Balch, "Roe v. Wade: No Basis in Law, Logic, or
History," in Louis P. Pojman and Francis Beckwith, eds., The Abortion Controversy: A
Reader (Boston: Jones and Bartlett, 1994), 86-108, esp. 93 ff.
26. See R. Jitte, ed., Geschichte der Abtreibung, Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart
(Mfinchen: C. H. Beck, 1993), 85 ff.
27. A brief summary of the development of concepts regarding the beginning of human
life can be found in the book by Norman M. Ford, When Did I Begin?: Conception of the
Human Individual in History, Philosophy, and Science (New York: Cambridge University
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of law infused by an Enlightenment spirit. Thus, the Preussische
Allgemeine Landrecht, of 1794 (I, 1,10) decrees that "the universal rights of
humanity are applicable also to children not yet born, from the moment of
their conception." The Austrian Allgemeine Buirgerliche Gesetzbuch of 1811
(para. 22), still in force today, and the Bavarian Penal Code of 1813
followed in the same spirit. In 1803, the first statute against abortion was
issued in England, narrowing further the equivalence between abortion and
homicide of the "quick fetus" (a fetus that already moves). This represents
a noteworthy change relative to the common law; all subsequent legislation
is subject to the influence of new medical knowledge."8
Without going into the particulars of a very complex history, we can see
that the problem of the state's defense of unborn life is a relatively modern
theme. The problem became more urgent with progress in science and
health. As Robert Spaemann has written, 9 in the past abortion was a
drama performed in the penumbras of society. That is no longer true today.
Abortion has become readily accessible in an easy, safe manner. The great
problem of the "liberalization" of abortion, which has been made into an
ordinary service in medical institutions and is even financed by health
insurance, is that society and the state, with full responsibility, officially
plan the killing of unborn human beings. It is no longer a question of
tolerating whit is notoriously an evil, but rather of making it easily
accessible to anyone, with the backing of the state. Causing directly the
death of innocent beings thus becomes an ordinary means protected by law
for resolving conflicts as old as human sexuality.
The problem of the "culture of death" is not, therefore, that of a "moral
collapse" of society, but rather the effect of the acquisition of a new power
over life, made accessible by modem science. This is also true in a special
way for the problem of euthanasia, made more acute by the fact that within
the framework and ethos of modem medicine it no longer seems justifiable
to take every action capable of prolonging life. By contrast, the modem
state is the first in history that possesses the means to guarantee an effective
defense of prenatal life; the modem state may nevertheless become an
accomplice in the planned killing of unwanted human lives, or life that has
become burdensome for the welfare system.30
Press, 1988), 19-51.
28. See Keown, Abortion, Doctors, and the Law.
29. R. Spaemann, "Sind alle Menschen Personen?," in R. L6w, ed., Bioethik. Philoso-
phisch-theologische Beitrage zu einem brisanten Thema (K61n: Communio, 1990), 48-5 8;
here: 56 ff.
30. Interesting impressions of this problem in Holland are reported by 0. Tolmien, Wann
ist der Mensch ein Mensch? EthikaufAbwegen (Mtlnchen: Hanser, 1993), 77 ft. See also
K. Drner, TOdliches Mitleid. Zur Frage der Unertriiglichkeitdes Lebens oder: die Soziale
Frage: Entstehung, Medizinisierung, NS-Endl'sung heute, morgen, 3rd ed. (Giltersloh:
Verlag Jakob von Hoddis, 1993); T. Bastian, ed., Denken-Schreiben-T6ten. Zur neuen
"Euthanasie "-Diskussion (Stuttgart: S. Hirzel, 1990).
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IV. MORAL AND CIVIL LAW ACCORDING TO EVANGELIUM VITAE
It is just this social context that has stimulated the Magisterium of the
Church to intervene against the increasingly widespread trend to "justify
certain crimes against life in the name of the rights of individual freedom,"
demanding "not only exemption from punishment but even authorization by
the State, so that these things can be done with total freedom and indeed
with the free assistance of health care systems."'"
So, according to Evangelium Vitae, it is not simply a question of asking
the state not to interfere in a "private sphere," but instead of claiming
"abortion rights," such as the right to be able to dispose of the life of the
unborn, even with the support and help of public health systems and
coverage by health insurance. It is within the context32 of the call for a
"legal legitimation" of an alleged "right to kill" that the Magisterium
reminds us of certain principles regarding the relationship between moral
and civil law.
According to Evangelium Vitae, the problem is twofold. It is first a
problem of democracy, in which on the basis of the vote of the majority any
law may be sanctioned. Second, however, it is also a problem of constitu-
tional law, which as such rises above democratic and legislative mecha-
nisms.
The encyclical maintains that "objective moral law which, as the 'natural
law' written in the human heart, is the obligatory point of reference for civil
law itself,"33 will always be the measure of the legitimacy of any vote in
a democracy. The democratic process cannot be "reduced to a mere
mechanism for regulating different and opposing interests on a purely
empirical basis."34 To assert that at times it is necessary to accept such a
reductive role, for lack of a better way to assure social peace, certainly
contains "some element of truth"; but in that case, the encyclical adds,
"without an objective moral grounding not even democracy is capable of
ensuring a stable peace."35
In this way, Evangelium Vitae confirms the central doctrine of the
encyclical Centesimus Annus,36 that an absolute truth about man, not a
relativist philosophy, is the foundation of democracy. When reading
Evangelium Vitae, one should not forget that the innovation of Centesimus
Annus was the affirmation of a fundamental congruence between this truth
about the human person and the modem culture of human rights, which is
clearly seen in the principle of the submission of democracy to law and
31. Evangelium Vitae, 4; cf. ibid., 11.




36. See sections 44-47.
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human rights,37 that is, according to the tradition of the rule of law and the
corresponding separation of powers.3"
Obviously, in the absence of such an institutional-juridical perspective,
referring to "objective moral law" or to the existence of "essential and
innate human and moral values which flow from the very truth of the
human being and... safeguard the dignity of the person" would remain a
sterile and ineffective appeal. Hence "no individual, no majority and no
State can ever create, modify, or destroy" such values, but instead they
"must only acknowledge, respect, and promote" them. 9 At this point, we
are much closer to the language of modem constitutionalism than to that of
tradition.
In my judgement, Evangelium Vitae does not intend to cast any doubt on
the legitimacy of democratic majoritarian mechanisms. It does not even
suggest that a law not in full consonance with the moral law is ipso facto
illegitimate. The encyclical does not establish an opposition between
democracy and a culture of human rights on the one hand and the moral law
on the other. It declares, instead, that civil law-meaning, primarily,
constitutions with fundamental personal rights-includes a morally relevant
dimension: the expression of that truth about man which in the end is also
the measure of the legitimacy of any decision made by a democratic
majority.
We can thus assert that the argument of Evangelium Vitae is strictly
constitutionalist. It situates itself at the legal-political level, but with the
peculiarity of integrating that level (following its own "political" logic) and
the ethical sphere, that is, the source of all human rights inasmuch as they
are a secularized product of an ethos formed within the Judeo-Christian
tradition with the support of Greek philosophy.
Here it is useful to cite the central passage of Evangelium Vitae (71) on
the subject:
Certainly the purpose of civil law is different and more limited in scope
than that of the moral law.... [It] is that of ensuring the common good
of people through the recognition and defense of their fundamental rights,
and the promotion of peace and of public morality. The real purpose of
civil law is to guarantee an ordered social existence in true justice. ....
Precisely for this reason, civil law must ensure that all members of
society enjoy respect for certain fundamental rights which innately belong
to the person, rights which every positive law must acknowledge and
guarantee.
The constitutionalist imprint of these formulations is easily perceived: the
power of the state is subordinated to the acknowledgment and guarantee of
37. CentesimusAnnus, 47.
38. Ibid., 44.
39. Evangelium Vitae, 71.
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individual rights. The words just quoted, however, recall the essentially
ethical or moral status of these rights. Thus, the mediation between moral
exigencies and the legal-political order is carried out through constitutional
law insofar as it includes fundamental rights. The encyclical does not deny
the "diverse" and "limited" character of civil law and its specific ends
(peace, orderly social coexistence, justice, public morality); at the same
time, however, it teaches that such functions have their roots in that truth
which came to be known as "human rights."
Admittedly, there are other interpretations that ignore fundamental rights
understood as an expression of a truth and view them as a sort of least
common denominator in a pluralistic society that foregoes any formulation
of a "common good" in terms of substantive values. Without discussing the
problem at this point, let us continue with the text of the encyclical, which
now goes a step further:
First and fundamental among these [rights] is the inviolable right to life
of every innocent human being. While public authority can sometimes
choose not to put a stop to something which-were it prohibited-would
cause more serious harm, it can never presume to legitimize as a right of
individuals--even if they are the majority of the members of society-an
offense against other persons caused by the disregard of so fundamental
a right as the right to life. (71)
Finally, here is the passage that includes perhaps the decisive argument
from a practical-legal viewpoint:
The legal toleration of abortion or of euthanasia can in no way claim to
be based on respect of the conscience of others, precisely because society
has the right and duty to protect itself against the abuses which can occur
in the name of conscience and under the pretext of freedom. (71)
So the encyclical proposes a three-part thesis:
(1) The unborn (individuals belonging to the species homo sapiens in
embryo and fetal form) possess a right to life. The question therefore is
placed within the scope of fundamental rights.
(2) It follows that such unborn individuals are human persons appropri-
ately entitled to such rights.
(3) The state has the duty not only to respect fundamental rights of
liberty, but also to have them respected against interference by others; in
the case of abortion, this means interference by the mother (perhaps under
pressure by others) and by the doctor.
This last point is the decisive one, because it clearly implies affirmations
(1) and (2). There are those who deny point (3). There are also those,
however, such as Ronald Dworkin, who deny that this question is pertinent
to "individual rights." Finally, there is the most extreme theory, but very
influential because it is internally coherent, which does not deny that (1) is
relevant, provided that the unborn is truly a person, the acknowledgment of
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which is, however, denied both to the unborn and to the baby after birth at
least up to a certain stage (the view of Mary Anne Warren, Peter Tooley,
Peter Singer, Helga Kuhse, and Norbert Hoerster). We will discuss this in
Section VI.
The doctrine of the encyclical truly opens an avenue for an argument
regarding fundamental rights and freedoms in a constitutional state.40 Let
us see now how the question presents itself in two concrete cases: the
Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America. The
ethical-political discussion, if it hopes to be practical and truly relevant,
must necessarily face the real problem within the juridical order of the state.
V. THE PROTECTION OF LIFE IN CONSTITUTIONAL STATES: THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The constitutional state that recognizes fundamental individual rights,
more than any other type of state, is compelled by its own inner legal-
political logic to provide an effective defense of life, including the lives of
the unborn. A thorough analysis of the differences between Germany and
the United States will give us sufficient grounds for judgment. What
interests us in both cases is the jurisprudence of the supreme constitutional
courts. Their approaches take on a paradigmatic value insofar as they are
antithetical.4 '
40. I omit the first paragraph of section 72 because I consider it unimportant: the
doctrine of the law that is unjust because it goes against natural law is applicable only in
those cases in which civil law commands or orders something to be done that is immoral.
In the case of abortion, this is not the fundamental problem. No one defends the right of the
legislator to order the carrying out of abortions. In the extreme case of the state's total
abstention from protecting the life of the unborn, there is no unjust law for the simple reason
that there is no law.
41. See also Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 24 if; H. Kaup, Der Schwangerschaflsabbruch
aus verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht. Eine rechtvergleichende Untersuchung anhand des
deutschen und des amerikanischenRechts (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 1991); H. Reis, Das
Lebensrechtdes ungeborenen Kindes als Verfassungsproblem (Tilbingen: J.C.B. Mohr Paul
Siebeck, 1984). For information on legislation and related problems in different countries,
see United Nations (Department of Economic and Social Development), Abortion Policies:
A Global Review, 3 vols. (New York: UN, 1992); P. Sachdev, ed., InternationalHandbook
on Abortion (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988); A. Eser and H.G. Koch, eds., Schwanger-
schaflsabbruchim internationalen Vergleich. RechtlicheRegelungen - SozialeRahmenbedin-
gungen - Empirische Grundlagen, (Teil 1: Europa; Teil 2: Aussereuropa), (Baden-Baden:
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987 and 1989); E. Ketting and Ph. von Pragg, Schwanger-
schaflsabbruch. Gesetz und Praxis im internationalen Vergleich (Tilbinger Reihe 5) (Tfilbin-
gen: DGVT, 1985); S.J. Frankowski and G.F. Cole, Abortion and Protection of the Human
Fetus: Legal Problems in a Cross-Cultural Perspective (Dordrecht; Martinus Nijhoff,
1987); E. von Hippel, "Der Schwangerschaftsabbruch in rechtsvergleichender Sicht," in H.
von Voss et al., eds., Chancenfiir das ungeborene Leben (K61n: K6lner Universititsverlag,
1988), 69-94.
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To a certain extent it is possible for the constitutional state not to
recognize and protect the right to life of the unborn. It depends on the
political will. My argument, therefore, is not a judgement of political
facts-which, in my view, do not correspond to what legal logic re-
quires-but of the legal-political ethics that animate democratic
constitutionalism. What I am concerned to highlight is that such will can
never be based on law; rather, it is precisely the legal-political logic that
points the way toward an effective legal defense of prenatal life.
A. The Jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court and Its
Implications
In Germany, the recognition of fundamental rights began in the 1960s to
evolve from their interpretation as simple individual "freedoms" claimed in
order to protect the individual from the state, to a more "institutional"
understanding of them. Fundamental rights not only represent the freedoms
of the individual in relation to the state but also express an order of values
to be realized by the political community; they constitute the aims that
define state functions and tasks.42
From the standpoint of the theory of fundamental rights, a decision of the
Federal Constitutional Court on 25 February 1975"' regarding an attempt
by the Bundestag to liberalize abortion," was a decisive turning point. It
was a turning point in understanding that fundamental rights (in particular
the right to life) not only guarantee immunity from interference or threats
by the state (the liberal idea of the status negativus, of law that protects
against the state), but they also confer on the individual, through state
42. See H.P. Bull, Die Staatsaufgabennach dem Grundgeselz(Kronberg/Ts: Athenaum
Verlag, 1977) esp. 155 if; P. Hiberle, Die Wesensgehaltgarantie des Art. 19 Abs. I
Grundgesetz. Zugleich ein Beitragzum institutionellenVerstandnisder Grundrechteund zur
Lehre vom Gesetzesvorbehalt, 3rd expanded ed. (Heidelberg: C.F. Miller, 1983) (partially
translated into Italian under the title: Le libertafondamentali nello Stato costituzionale, P.
Ridola, ed. [Roma: La Nuova Italia Scientifica, 1992]); K. Lw, Die Grundrechte.
Verstandnis und Wirklichkeit in beiden Teilen Deutschlands (Miinchen: UTB/Verlag
Dokumentation, 1977).
43. The most important passages from the judgment are found in the excellent book by
H. Thomas and W. Kluth, eds., Das zumutbare Kind. Die zweite Bonner Fristenregelung
vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht (Herford: Busse-Seewald, 1993). The original
version of Hiaberle's important study, mentioned in the preceding footnote, goes back to
1962 and it therefore does not include this pivotal decision of the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht. In the expanded edition of 1983 the decision is mentioned briefly (at 289) in a manner
that shows how this judgment establishes that the nasciturus's right to life unconditionally
prevails over competing interests.
44. For the history of the debate, see M. Gante, §218 in der Diskussion. Meinungs- und
Willensbildungl954-1976, (Diisseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1991) (Forschungen und Quellen
zur Zeitgeschichte Bd. 21).
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action, the right to protection from. similar interference by others, as is the
case of the unbom with respect to the mother or doctors.4
The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court thus includes two
fundamental affirmations. First of all, the nasciturus is not a being "not yet
human," but is in the course of developing its humanity; it is a human being
that is developing at all time as a human being (a process that obviously
continues for many years after birth). On the basis of that premise, the
court equates the right to life of the unborn with that of any other human
life, explicitly declaring that in the phrase "everyone possesses the right to
life... "(in Article 2, Section 2 of the Grundgesetz), the word "everyone"
refers to each living human individual, including therefore the unborn
human being. It follows that his or her right to life prevails at any time
over the mother's right to self-determination.'
The second affirmation recognizes that the right to life of the unborn
requires the state not only to abstain from any interference with the life of
the unborn, but also to protect that life if threatened by others. Since the
right to life is the fundamental good, the source for any other right or legal
entitlement of the individual, any legally recognized interference that would
contradict it cannot be tolerated in principle, with the exception of a case
relating to the application of the principle of proportionality (for instance,
when the life of the unborn child seriously threatens the mother's life).47
45. Fundamental in this respect: J. Isensee, Das Grundrecht auf Sicherheit Zu den
Schutzpflichten des freiheitlichen Verfassungsstaates (Schriften der Juristischen Gesell-
schafi e.V. Berlin, Heft 79), (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983); E. Klein, "Grund-
rechtliche Schutzpflicht des Staates," Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 42 (1989) 1633-
1640; H. Tr6ndle, "Der Schutz des ungeborenen Lebens in unserer Zeit," Zeitschrifftir
Rechtspolitik22 (1989) 54-61; D. Lorenz, "Recht auf Leben und k6rperliche Unversehrt-
heit," in J. Isensee and P. Kirchhof, eds., Handbuch des Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, Vol. VI (Heidelberg: C.F. Miller, 1989), 3-39. See also W. Kluth,
"Verfassungauftrag Lebensschutz. Vorgeburtlicher Lebensschutz zwischen staalicher
Anmassung und verfassungsrechtlicher Pflicht," 93-117; and W. Hdfling, "Die
Abtreibungsproblematik und das Grundrecht auf Leben," 119-144, in H. Thomas and W.
Kluth, Das zumutbare Kind.
46. According to Article 1, Section 1 of the Grundgesetz, the state has a duty to respect
and protect human dignity. In the abortion decision by the German Constitutional Court in
1993, the court stated that the Human Dignity Clause of Article 1 is the basis of the state's
duty to protect the right to life, which is affirmed in Article 2, Section 2.
47. This position has been confirmed by the second judgment of the German Con-
stitutional Court, in 1993; the whole text can be found in Juristen Zeitung (special edition)
of 7 June 1993. On the law voted by the Bundestag in 1992 that brought about this judg-
ment, see the study, stemming from an expert's report requested by the Bavarian government,
by M. Kriele, Die nicht-therapeutischeAbtreibung vor dem Grundgesetz (Berlin: Dun-
ker & Humblot, 1992). The report commissioned to Professor Albin Eser by the Bundestag
instead reached a conclusion favorable to the law that was finally declared unconstitutional
by the Constitutional Court; cf. A. Eser, Schwangerschaftsabbruch: Aufdem verfassungs-
rechtlichen Prffstand. Rechtsgutachen im Normenkontrollverfahren zum Schwangeren-
und Familienhilfegesetz von 1992 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994).
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A dissenting opinion in this case asserted that fundamental rights should
only have the function of protecting the individual from interference by the
state; a right to life would only exist to safeguard oneself from the state's
threats to life. This theory-which I shall henceforth refer to as a "proto-
liberal" view-assumes that conferring a duty on the state to restrict the
freedom and ostensibly private choices of its citizens perverts the essential
meaning of the aforementioned rights.4 Precisely this theory, how-
ever-underlying the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade-is rejected by the German Federal Constitutional Court with the
double affirmation that the unborn child possesses a fundamental right to
life, just as any other living human being does, and that the state is obliged
to intervene to protect it from aggression by third parties.
Such a stand in favor of state intervention is based on a Hobbesian
argument: the coercive power of the state is legitimized precisely by its
function of establishing security, order, and peaceful coexistence among
men."' For this purpose, the citizens delegate to the state a monopoly of
legitimate violence, renouncing the right to defend themselves or to take the
law into their own hands, thus establishing a mutual linkage of subordina-
tion and protection. This development, however, clearly implies that the
state also has the duty of guaranteeing the security and protection of the
individual, who has freely deprived himself of the possibility of self-
protection. The "liberal" notion of freedoms in opposition to the state, to
protect against the state's interference, is only established later in history.
As Professor Isensee stresses, the liberal and constitutionalist idea of
freedoms asserted against the state already presupposes the state's protective
function. Liberty has two sides: security by means of the state and security
in relation to the state. These are the two sides of civil liberty.5"
Especially in the case of the unborn, the mere status negativus (freedom
and security from the state) is obviously insufficient. For the unborn, the
greatest threat is not the state, but the mother. So if the state does not
confer protection, the right.to life would serve no purpose for the unborn
(the same is true for babies already born but still small and totally
48. This argument has remained without decisive influence on legal doctrine: see P.
Preu, "Freiheitsgefhrdung durch die Lehre von den grundrechtlichen Schutzpflichten,"
Juristen Zeitung 46 (1991) 265-271, esp. 266; and R. Wahl and J. Masing, "Schutz durch
Eingriff?," JuristenZeitung45 (1990) 553-563. The notion "protoliberal" refers to the first
of two historical phases of liberalism. The first phase is characterized by the establishment
of individual rights against the state (e.g., the absolutist state). The second phase adheres to
the view that individual rights are to protect persons not only from the sovereign state but
also from one another (that is, from other persons). In this second historical phase, it is
widely understood that a political society is shaped by persons living together in mutual
respect of rights.
49. See Isensee, Das Grundrecht auf Sicherheit, and also Klein, Grundrechtliche
Schutzpflichtdes Staates, 1635 ff.
50. J. Isensee, Das Grundrecht auf Sicherheit, 6; 21ff.
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defenseless). It seems logical, then, that the only means for the unborn to
enjoy ari effective right to life is through the state's guarantee to protect that
life from private interference, from whomever may be interested in
eliminating it.
As we have already mentioned, however, the problem is that the implicit
calculation in a self-renunciation of private defense, even if it turns out to
be particularly suitable as the basis for the duty of the state to safeguard life
against threats from third parties, does not seem to work in the case of the
unborn. Even if protecting prenatal life now appears to be an incontestable
duty of the state, it is not clear how it can be sufficiently motivated by a
purely contractarian logic. Once the right to life of the unborn is granted,
we cannot see how to deduce in a cogent manner the duty of the state to
protect prenatal life on the basis of a merely utilitarian conception, whether
of the Hobbesian or Lockean type. It seems that the state protects only the
interests of the born, that is, those who represent the parties to the social
contract. This appears to be implied, at least hypothetically, in the image of
mutual self-renunciation and subordination to state power.
The dilemma is evident also in the question of the measures with which
the state must carry out its protective role. These must be proportional,
reasonable, and not excessive. For instance, it would be contrary to those
principles to expect that the state place under the surveillance of a
policeman every expectant mother until birth, to prevent a possible abortion.
The protection of the unborn must nevertheless be effective. Discussions
mainly concern the question of whether the most appropriate means is the
penal code or some other measure(s). In 1975, the Federal Constitutional
Court established that whenever other measures for the defense of the life
of the unborn prove to be ineffective, the state is obliged to intervene with
the criminal law.5'
Abortion undoubtedly remains an unlawful act (rechtswidrig). So it is out
of the question that it could be regulated as an ordinary service, provided
by the health care system. It cannot be financed by insurance, because the
state would thus be favoring, indirectly, an illegal act. We can also affirm
that the state is obliged to promote measures capable of preventing situations
51. According to the 1993 judgment and the subsequent law adopted in 1995, the
legislator can, without violating the Constitution, largely renounce the use of the criminal
law, resorting to preventive and compulsory counseling in order to encourage the expectant
mothers to accept the baby. By renouncing the resort to the criminal law, appealing to the
woman's sense of responsibility, and stressingthe availability of social assistance, the court's
decision was meant to ensure that this counselling gave more effective protection to the
unborn. That objective, however, seems to have been undermined by the 1995 law, which
declares that the counselling must be "open to any outcome," in the sense of precluding any
attempt to influence the women's decision. In most instances, this effectively limits the
counsellor to providing information about the availability of abortion and issuing the required
certificate, which, de facto, is a "license to abort." As of August, 1999, the Constitutional
Court has not had occasion to determine the constitutionality of the 1995 law.
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of serious conflict, creating a climate of respect for life (and therefore
rejecting any pro-abortion propaganda by public means). Furthermore, it is
the task of public authorities to organize or stimulate specific private
initiatives, to promote a social net capable of guaranteeing the survival of
babies born but rejected by their mothers, thereby encouraging expectant
mothers to give birth to their babies. In a culture of life, not death,
completion of the pregnancy would be made attractive to the women even
in cases of true conflict. The alternative, the planned elimination of these
human beings," implies the assassination of a woman's conscience, to use
Mother Teresa's strong expression.
Reality shows, however, how such measures are still inadequate. The
need for the criminal law appears inevitable. It provides protection for the
woman herself, often exposed to pressure from others, such as the father of
the baby or the surrounding family or social environment. It is almost
impossible for a woman facing such pressures to resist choosing a procedure
that is legal and therefore presented as an ordinary medical service financed
by health insurance. In this respect, it is precisely the criminal law that
provides legitimate help to the woman and often represents a last appeal.
This does not automatically imply the need to inflict the expected penalty
upon the woman, since criminal law applies upon recognition of the guilt
of the incriminated person. Criminal law is very flexible, and it would be
just for abortion doctors, especially those who make a business of abortion,
to be the ones punished. 3 Finally, to maintain in society and in individual
conscience an awareness of the injustice and violation of the law implied by
a given behavior, its criminalization will usually prove to be indispens-
able. 4 The fact that this criminal law cannot be enforced systematically
is analogous to the case of rape within marriage. Though difficult to apply,
this penal measure is being promoted by some who justify it because of the
grave wrongfulness of raping one's spouse.
Even though I consider the intervention of criminal law to be inevitable,
its legitimacy must be based on a specific and well-articulated reasoning.
The German Federal Constitutional Court clearly affirms that the question
of a possible intervention through the criminal law is not equivalent to the
52. W. Geiger, "Rechtliche Beurteilung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs,"in H. von Voss,
ed., Chancen fur das ungeborene Leben, 55.
53. Fundamental rights rest with the holder of the right and therefore cannot be made
relative. Criminal law, instead, allows a differentiation according to the culpability of the
accused for injury to the fundamental rights of others. Such differentiation, however, cannot
ever attenuate the duty of safeguarding the fundamental right; see Daniel Rhonheimer, "Das
Recht des hilflosen Lebens: Zum Zusammenhang von Menschenrechten, Existenzrecht,
Rechtsfdhigkeit und Rechtsstaat," in P.P. Maller-Schmid, ed., Begrandung der
Menschenrechte (Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 26), (Stuttgart: Franz
Steiner Verlag, 1986), 45-127, esp. 47 ff.
54. Evangelium Vitae asserts this in section 90. Cf. also Kriele, Die nicht-therapeutische
Abtreibung vor dem Grundgesetz; Gante, § 218 in der Diskussion, 218 if.
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question of whether the state is obliged to punish particular actions because
they are immoral. To provide an answer, the Constitutional Court affirms
that one must consider not only the importance of the good involved (in this
case life), but also the limits beyond which its injury may become harmful
to society. The real effectiveness and applicability of penal sanctions must
be evaluated as well.
While it remains a morally unjustifiable act, a valid argument cannot be
found to punish an abortion carried out in the event of a diagnosed danger
to the life of the mother. In that case-a well-chosen example of the
difference between moral and legal-political logic-the superiority of the
right to life of the unborn would not be even defensible, according to the
common view of pro-life jurists. The state, in fact, cannotforce a woman
to sacrifice her life to save.the life of the unborn. Two equal goods are
involved here. Furthermore, it is difficult to show the harm to society and
human coexistence caused by such behavior. This type of abortion, then,
should not even be considered illegal (with respect to the Grundgesetz ), but
justified."
The case of what is known as the "embryo-pathological diagnosis"
appears to be different from the preceding. (At present, under the German
legislation of 1995, this diagnosis is now likened to a life-threatening
pregnancy, giving rise to more problems.) Contrary to a widespread
misunderstanding, this diagnosis is not based strictly on "eugenic" grounds,
in the sense of intending to decriminalize or even declare legal the killing
of an unborn human who is handicapped or subnormal or disabled, because
its future life is considered unworthy of being lived. That is to say, this
diagnosis is not intended to legalize the killing of a fetus "in his own
interest" (as Peter Singer and others would say), but in the interests of the
mother. It is not considered possible to demand that the mother give birth
and take care of a baby with such disabilities. Thus, the embryo-pathologi-
cal diagnosis is based on a weighing of the good of the "unborn life" and
an ill-defined right of the mother, which might be called the "right to a
healthy baby."
We can immediately perceive the inhumanity inherent in the proclamation
of a right of this sort. It is incoherent inasmuch as the German legal system
had previously equated the constitutional protection of the life of the unborn
with the protection of the life of any other individual who is already born.
The embryo-pathological argument must also in principle justify infanticide
for analogous reasons (it would even seem more logical since prenatal tests
have a margin of error, so it appears much more sensible to wait for the
birth of the unborn child and then proceed to infanticide).
55: The problem, pointed out by some authors, consists in the intention initially to favor
the mother's life, but "later the same criterion has been used to protect the mother's health,
then her psychological health, then for social reasons"; cf. E. Sgreccia, Manuale di Bioetica,
I, 2nd ed. (Milano: Vita e pensiero, 1994), 399.
156 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE (1998)
The implicit reasons for such a procedure are revealed in the general
attitude toward the physically and mentally disabled. It is also evident that
the practice of such behavior will deeply change the conditions of the
handicapped within our society, precisely together with the growth of
knowledge of the embryo and the fetus as a result of scientific progress.
The value of mutual respect for life will weaken and become corroded.
This clearly applies also to other diagnoses, such as the "psycho-social" one,
which ultimately renders the embryo-pathological one superfluous since it
declares legal any abortion carried out whenever the unborn may constitute
a potential threat to the psychological stability or the social or professional
prospects of the woman (or possibly of the couple).56
What is certain in all these cases is that the legal-political argumentation
adopted by the German Federal Constitutional Court does not appear
disposed to tolerate a generalized "right to self-determination" of the woman
that would prevail even for a limited time over the right to life of the
unborn. But this appears to have been exactly what the Supreme Court of
the United States has granted in Roe v. Wade, the decision that declared
unconstitutional a Texas law of 1857 which prohibited abortion except in
the case of a diagnosed danger to the life of the mother.
B. The United States of America: The Right to Abortion as a Liberty
Protected by the Constitution
The Constitution of the United States of America, unlike that of the Basic
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, does not explicitly recognize a
"right to life." The American Constitution did not even originally include
any separate list or "bill" of fundamental rights. The Bill of Rights was
added only in 1791, and other specifications concerning civil rights were
inserted subsequently, according to the requirements of the historical
situation.
57
An example of such an addition is the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified
in 1868. The Due Process Clause of this amendment, analogous to the Fifth
Amendment of 1791, affirms the constitutional right of every person to
lawful judicial proceedings, and the Equal Protection Clause mandates that
persons be treated equally before the law. The relevant part of the text
reads as follows: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
56. I am not speaking here of the case of verified criminality (that is, rape). Not because
I believe it to be licit, but because here again the problem is different, in the sense that the
pregnancy cannot be imputed to the mother; it is not the effect of a free act. For the
legislator, it can then be a case in which he does not have to intervene, at least not
necessarily, out of motives of Zumutbarkeit (reasonableness), for instance. Supposing,
however, that even in this case the unborn has a right to life, it will be difficult to establish
the basis for the lawfulness of such an abortion.
57. The Fifth Amendment, ratified in 1791, protects the "life" of a "person" against
deprivation by the national government without "due process of law."
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property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
At least two previous decisions (Griswold v. Connecticut" in 1965 and
Eisenstadt v. Baird59 in 1972) had interpreted these clauses as admitting the
existence of a constitutional right to privacy. In declaring invalid a
Massachusetts law that prohibited the sale or distribution of contraceptives
to unmarried persons, Eisenstadt applied this right to what some scholars
have called "procreative autonomy." In Roe v. Wade this right was
extended to abortion.'0
The majority opinion in Roe, written by Justice Harry A. Blackmun,
justifies the decision in the following terms: a law, or any other interven-
tion by the state that would prohibit a woman from freely disposing of her
unborn child, would be a violation of her constitutional right to privacy.
Blackmun writes that "we feel" that the Fourteenth Amendment encompass-
es the right of the woman to decide "whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy."' The opinion also maintains that such a right is not absolute.
It is said to find its limit when reaching certain matters that are of interest
to the state, such as the woman's health, the quality of the health care
system, and finally prenatal life, beginning from the moment the fetus is
viable (that is, capable of living independently from the mother, in case of
premature birth).62
These elements immediately distinguish it from the German constitutional
situation: on the basis of the German Grundgesetz, a law that forbids
abortion has the juridical meaning of protecting a fundamental right of the
unborn, provided for in the constitution. In the United States, by contrast,
the same law is deemed an intrusion on the the woman's freedom to decide
whether or not to go forward with a pregnancy. The difference reflects the
development of German juridical doctrine, which sees in fundamental rights
an order of values to be realized by political society, whereas the United
States' conception remains at a protoliberal, individualistic level, relating to
the freedoms to be set "against the state."63
58. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
59. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. Ibid.; 153.
62. Ibid., 153-155; 161-166. Note that in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the
companion case to Roe v. Wade, maternal health was defined in extremely broad terms. It
was said to comprise all factors ("physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the
woman's age") relevant to the patient's well-being (Doe v. Bolton, at 192). When read in
conjunction with the concluding paragraphs of Roe v. Wade, this broad understanding of
maternal health suggests that the pregnant woman is at liberty to have an abortion even after
viability so long as "in appropriate medical judgment" it is necessary for the "health" of the
mother (Roe v. Wade, at 165).
63. See Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law, 33 ff. An important contrary
position, in defense of Roe, is taken by Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument
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From this point arises the question whether it is possible to include the
unborn also within the "persons" mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment.
For Blackmun, however, it is fundamental that the unborn child cannot be
a "constitutional person"; he submits that the use of the word "person" in
the Constitution has only postnatal applications." Furthermore, according
to Blackmun, the allegedly higher level of tolerance toward abortion in the
nineteenth century is evidence that the word "person" used in the Fourteenth
Amendment does not include the unborn.65 There is no precedent that
recognizes the unborn child as a person within the meaning of this
amendment, says Blackmun."
It may seem correct, then, to affirm that on the basis of conventional
legal sources (constitutional text, case law, and nineteenth-century statutes)
it is not possible to bestow any right on the unborn. Nevertheless, the
simple deduction of procreative autonomy deriving from the text and
precedent implies other presuppositions, and here begin the "mysteries" of
Roe v. Wade. We may ask:
(1) In a legal question concerning the life of the unborn, why did the
Court limit itself to the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, which does not
address the question of (possible) rights of the unborn?
(2) Why suppose that the right to privacy might not be limited by another
possible right, such as the right to life of the unborn?
Let us look at the second question first. We may recall that the German
Federal Constitutional Court did not encounter any difficulty in affirming
that the word "everyone" in Article 2, Section 2 of the Grundgesetz
("everyone possesses the right to life") includes every "living human being,
and therefore also the one not yet born." The German Constitutional Court
assumed that the decisive basis for an entitlement to be treated equally to
others plainly consists in being a (living) human, that is, a living being
belonging to the biological species homo sapiens. Roe v. Wade is
distinguishable in that the German court did not dwell on an alleged
meaning of "the text," but acknowledged the reality of the new existence of
a human being, a reality sufficiently known on the basis of the evidence
furnished by modem science.67
about Abortion and Euthanasia (London: Harper Collins, 1993). For an interesting, resolute
criticism of Blackmun, see Hadley Arkes, First Things: An Inquiry into the First Principles
of Morals and Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), chapters XV, XVI, and
XVII. (The author nevertheless seems to me to be exaggerating in denying the existence of
a private sphere, immune from the interference of civil law.)
64. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-157.
65. Ibid., 158.
66. Ibid., 157-158.
67. It is important to note that such evidence is not denied today even by the most
relentless advocates of freedom of abortion, such as the followers of the theories of Michael
Tooley, Peter Singer, Norbert Hoerster; they merely deny that an individual of the human
species is already aperson with the corresponding right to life. We shall speak briefly about
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Even if for Justice Blackmun the right to privacy is "not absolute," but
limited where the "interests of the state" are implicated in relation to
prenatal life, this obviously does not confer any indefeasible right on the
carrier of that life. Consequently, the decisive point does not seem to
consist in the existence or nonexistence of a right to privacy-a question
that in this context seems irrelevant-but rather whether the unborn, in the
embryonic stage or in the fetal stage, is or is not a human being with a
corresponding right to life capable of restricting the "right to privacy," as
well as any other freedom or right of the mother.
The question of whether the unborn is a person in the constitutional sense
does not depend so much on the different passages where the Constitution
speaks of "persons," not even those of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
rather from the answer tout court to the question of whether the unborn is
a person or not. The fact that the unborn is not a person in one or more
specific legal contexts, such as the Fourteenth Amendment, does not
necessarily mean that it is not to be considered a person. Nor does it mean
that it is undeserving of those protections and entitlements that every person
enjoys precisely insofar as he or she is a human being. This, rather than the
putative right to privacy, is the decisive point here. And the very exclusion
of this question is the foundation of Roe v. Wade.6
Furthermore, Blackmun did not show that the legal analysis could
proceed without philosophic analysis. As Mary Ann Glendon has written,
Justice Blackmun "has diligently avoided describing the fetus either as
human or as alive." 9  In this regard, Blackmun wrote: "We need not
resolve the difficult question of when life begins."7
For Blackmun, it is a question on which there are as many opinions as
there are religions, philosophies, and scientific theories. He therefore
concentrates on the issue of "viability."'', In his view, only the right to life
of the fetus already able to survive independently from the mother would be
defensible, from both "logical and biological" standpoints.72 In defending
Blackmun more than twenty years later, Ronald Dworkin writes that an idea
of some antiabortionists, according to which the unborn is a constitutional
person, derives from the theological-religious conviction that "God, at the
moment of conception provides the human fetus with a rational soul and that
a rational soul possesses the moral right to live."73 Yet Dworkin's account
is mistaken because the "person" is not "the soul," and we cannot affirm
them later.
68. Blackmun admits that if the unborn were a "constitutional person," the entire.
argument against the Texas law would collapse. The same is affirmed by Dworkin, Life 's
Dominion, 116.
69. Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law, 34.
70. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159.
71. For a criticism of the concept of viability, see Arkes, First Things, 376 ff.
72. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163.
73. Dworkin, Life's Dominion, 110.
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that the human fetus is a person because it has a rational soul. Rather, it is
maintained that the living fetus has a soul because it is a human person and
that it is a person precisely because and inasmuch as he or she is a living
individual of the species homo sapiens. The latter point is a matter of scien-
tific fact, not "religion." Both Blacknun and Dworkin err in refusing to
recognize the fimdamental relevance of an individual belonging to the
human species-the truth that it is just such belonging that implies being a
person with an equal right to life.74
Denying the status of the unborn as a person, Blackmun referred to
tradition of the common law, with the words: "the unborn have never been
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense."'75 What, however,
does "a person in the whole sense" mean? Does it mean, perhaps, that in
the common law the ufiborn is considered a sort of half-person? A person
in some lesser sense? A person, but somewhat less than a born one? This
is impossible. Half-persons, or three-quarter persons, do not exist. Instead,
there exist individual humans who are true and authentic persons, but who
have not yet developed all of the properties typical of persons (for example,
certain physical attributes; a certain level of intelligence and formation; and
the capacity to act freely and responsibly). These properties may develop
in such individuals precisely because they are persons.76
74. On this matter, see A. Suarez, "Ist der menschliche Embryo geistig beseelt?,"Annales
Theologici 4 (1990) 69-107, esp. 93. A certain inability to understand the position of the
Magisterium of the Catholic Church on the fundamental identity between "human person"
and "human individual" has become almost universal. Even authors engaged in refuting the
so-called "Catholic position" seem to err on this point, thinking that "per~on" is the individual
soul, and not the human individual, a substantial unity of body and soul. This error, which
invalidates the whole argumentation by such authors, can be found in A. Leist, Eine Frage
des Lebens. Ethik der AbIreibung und kanstlichen Befruchtung (Frankfurt/M.: Campus,
1990), 110, where surprisingly he links himself to N.M. Ford, When Did I Begin?, whose
exposition on this point (61-101) is clearly correct. According to Ford, the person is not "the
human soul," but the individual of a human nature.
75. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162.
76. Effectively, Anglo-Saxon common law has recognized the so-called "Born Alive
Rule" since the thirteenth century, according to which the killing of a fetus prior to birth,
although considered to be misprision, was not a homicide according to the law. Bonnie
Steinbock, Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 105 ff. (a book that defends the judgment in Roe v.
Wade as well as the idea that the unborn cannot be the holder of a right to life), makes an
attempt-referring to Edward Coke, Chief Justice and the famous author of the Petition of
Right in the 1600s-to read the Born Alive Rule as reflecting, first, the fact that at the time
the fetus was considered to be a part of the mother and not to have a separate existence (an
opinion that we can now say is obsolete), and second, the belief that "a fetus is not yet a
fully developed human being, a person like the rest of us" (106). Even if this were the
opinion of Edward Coke (and later of Blackstone), on the basis of the still dominant
influence of the Aristotelian-scholastic theory of the later "animation" of the fetus, it is
certainly possible to correct the venerable jurisprudential tradition of the common law on the
basis of more current and modern scientific knowledge. It seems, however, that Blackstone
was thinking instead about the question of a judicial ascertainment of the existence of a
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The fact that the law does not extend all of the rights of persons to the
unbom-because the unborn, for example, lack the present capacity to
exercise or to benefit from those rights-does not mean that they would not
benefit from a right to life. Clearly, they would. Distinctions before the
law do not mean, for example, that a legal adult is "more of a person" with
an "elevated right to life" than, say, a minor. The right to life obviously
plays a special role. Every other right, even if still not accorded to the
unborn, may be granted to them at a later time, according to suitability and
maturity; other rights may even be revoked from a mature person and later
restored. This is not the case with respect to the right to life, which
therefore occupies a singular place. The necessity of recognizing it is not
based on the development of specific properties typical of persons, but on
the fact of being an individual who will develop such properties-in other
words, on the basis of "being a person."
It does not appear to be a problem that the Constitution confers certain
rights only to those who satisfy certain conditions-such as age-as long as
the principles of equality before the law are protected. As we shall see in
Section VII, however, granting such rights assumes that the individual in
question is a person, with a right to live; otherwise, it would not be
plausible to confer on him or her any civil right. No civil norm is legiti-
mately capable of conferring on or withholding from a person the right to
life. The civil law is for human persons, but it cannot (without arbitrary and
therefore unjust discrimination) make the question of who counts as a human
person a matter of intrasystemic legal analysis. Or it does so, as did the Roe
Court, at the risk of catastrophic moral error.
Possessing the right to life cannot depend on the law, but instead on a
fact antecedent to the law. The legislator is therefore obliged simply to
ascertain whether the individual is or is not, in truth, a human person, with
a corresponding right to live. The fact that the law does not define who is
a "human person" does not change anything. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court of the United States should have been obliged to decide what it
expressly refused to discuss: when human life begins.
Given that the unborn is a human person with all of the rights connected
with "being man," we must conclude that Roe v. Wade is simply based on
an error. In the text of the American Constitution there is no basis for
establishing whether the right of privacy does or does not include a
human being at the time of an indictment for homicide: in order for someone to be
condemned for homicide there must be clear and visible proof-in rerum natura, as it was
said-of the prior existence of the victim, not just of the incriminating act. See also Keown,
Abortion, Doctors, and the Law, 3-12; Clarke D. Forsythe, "Homicide of the Unborn Child:
The Born Alive Rule and Other Anachronisms," Valparaiso University Law Review 21
(1987) 563; Joseph W. Dellapenna, "The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and
Law," UniversityofPittsburgh Law Review40 (1979) 359; Horan and Balch, "Roe v. Wade:
No Basis in Law, Logic, or History," 93 ff.
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woman's right to decide whether the unborn will live or die before reaching
viability.
The Court could have declared that it was not qualified to decide the
question, leaving it to the legislative competence of the several states."
I nevertheless think that, instead of declaring itself unqualified, the Court
in 1973 could have appealed to sources of law not explicitly contemplated
in the text of the Constitution. The Court's decision to limit itself to the
express provisions of the Constitution could be justified only on the basis
of a "positivist" or "originalist" interpretation of the Constitution." This
is not, however, the position of those who currently defend the decision in
Roe v. Wade, such as Ronald Dworkin.79
A non-positivist approach could offer the possibility of having recourse
to sources of law outside of the text of the Constitution, which in its Ninth
Amendment states that 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." According to this amendment, which was adopted in 1791, there
is an explicit guarantee of rights unmentioned in the written text of the
Constitution. One of the reasons for this was to calm the concerns of those
who were initially opposed to the inclusion of a bill of rights in the
Constitution, for fear that it could imply an abrogation of rights that existed
but were not enumerated in the written text."
Whatever its precise meaning, the Ninth Amendment is a legal text that
affirms the existence of sources of law antecedent to and outside of the text
of the Constitution. We should not forget that prior to the creation of the
federal United States, individual states already had their own bills of rights.
77. This was the argument of the famous article of John Hart Ely, "The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade," Yale Law Journal 82 (1973),920. Criticisms of the
judgment in Roe v. Wade on the part of eminent specialists in constitutional law-many of
whom favored abortion-were numerous; see the discussion in Glendon, Abortion and
Divorce in Western Law, 44 ff.; 171 ff. (bibliography at note 175). A more extensive and
recent bibliography can be found in Maureen Muldoon, The Abortion Debate in the United
States and Canada: A Sourcebook (New York: Garland, 1991).
78. A tiotable representative of this line of thought is Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of
America: The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989). See
also Bork's article, "Natural Law and the Constitution," First Things (March, 1992), 16-20,
and the critical responses to it in the May issue from the same year. More systematically:
Russell Hittinger, "Natural Law in the Positive Laws: A Legislative or Adjudicative Issue?,"
The Review of Politics 55 (1993) 5-34. Also useful for understanding the problem is
Michael J. Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988),
chapter six.
79. Dworkin, Life'sDominion. See also Dworkin's TakingRightsSeriously,2nd expand-
ed ed. (London: Duckworth, 1977), 131ff.
80. See Alexander Hamilton's polemic in Federalist No. 84 against the idea of
including a "Bill of Rights" in the Constitution; cf. Hadley Arkes, Beyond the Constitution
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), chapter four.
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The most famous codification of rights was that of Virginia, in 1776, which
states in its first paragraph, as a "right of the people":
That all men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they
cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity; namely the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing
property and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."'
This text does not speak of the procedural rights of citizens, but instead of
"rights naturally inherent in man." It is the language of the modem tradition
of human rights, based on the fundamental idea that humans possess certain
rights because they are human and not because the rights have been
conferred on them by society, and that the most fundamental of these rights
is the right to life. As we have already seen, in the Prussian Allgemeine
Landrecht, following the progress of embryological knowledge toward the
end of the eighteenth century and under the influence of Enlightenment
ideas, "the universal rights of humanity" were extended even to "children
not yet born, beginning from the time of conception."
I do not mean to assert that the constitutional texts of the several states
are to be considered binding on the case law of the Supreme Court of the
United States; they are valid, of course, within the jurisdictional sphere of
the respective states. Nevertheless, they could be sources of a law that has
until now remained partially circumscribed in the United States for specific
historical reasons. As Martin Kriele has observed,"2 an important reason
for not having introduced the "rights of man" into the 1791 Constitution, let
alone the concept of "human dignity," was the acquiescence in the interests
of the slave states. Not even the Virginia language "that all men . . ." had
any legal effect. In Massachusetts, instead, the declaration on the liberty
and equality of all men led in 1783 to the abolition of slavery. Certainly,
the slave owners could not accept the inclusion of any similar language in
the Constitution. This explains why the idea of an equality of rights
founded solely on "being man" or "human dignity" remained absent from
U.S. constitutionalism. Here, in addition, is the logical premise of the
famous Dred Scott v. Sandford decision in 1857, which denied the status of
citizenship to slaves.
In light of the preceding, we can now see that the Court's legal options
were open. The Court could have chosen to rely on the Ninth Amendment
81. The constitution of Massachusetts speaks of "certain natural, essential and inalien-
able rights," and the Declaration of Independence of 1776 asserts as "self-evident truths" that
all men "are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights," among which is also
the right to life.
82. Einfthrung in die Staatslehre. Die geschichtlichen Legitimtsgrundlagen des
demokratischen Verfassungsstaates, 4th ed. (Opladen: Westdt. Verlag, 1990), 160 ff.
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as justification for answering the pressing philosophic question, When does
life begin?
83
As we have observed, at key junctures in Roe v. Wade the Court adopted
a rigidly positivist attitude to the rights of the unborn. Curiously, however,
the Court also accepted the expansive account of the unenumerated right to
privacy offered by the plaintiffs, and without serious analysis of legal
materials such as text, precedent, and statutory practice. This discrepancy
seems to have been the basis for the remark in Justice White's dissent that
the Court's decision was "an exercise of raw judicial power." '84
A later effort to have Roe v. Wade overruled in the 1992 case Planned
Parenthood v. Casey was unsuccessful.8 5 The latter decision partly
modified the former without overruling it, inasmuch as it declared
constitutional certain statutory provisions in Pennsylvania, which imposed
restrictions on the freedom to abort. Based on the principle of stare decisis,
the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey argued that it is not
possible simply to declare as erroneous a judgment that for over twenty
years has stamped the politics of abortion and the public conscience of the
nation. Moreover, according to the joint opinion, even if the result in Roe
v. Wade was mistaken, overruling it would be the equivalent of unnecessari-
ly weakening the legitimacy of the Court and the fidelity of the whole
nation to the rule of law. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia asserted
instead that, supposing that there is a near-unanimous conviction on the part
of specialists that the arguments in Roe v. Wade were inconsistent and
erroneous, one could arrive at a conclusion that the principle of stare decisis
should not be applied to this case. In sum: the fact that there exists a
precedent, and that it was applied, does not dispense with the need to ask
whether that precedent was mistaken.
VI. STRATEGIES AGAINST THE LEGISLATIVE DEFENSE OF LIFE
Our discussion of the abortion decisions of the German Constitutional
Court and the U.S. Supreme Court allows us to identify a few decisive
points in our attempts to justify an effective protection of prenatal life in a
constitutional democracy. We have seen that a coherent legal argument in
defense of the unborn depends on the recognition of the unborn as a human
83. We should not forget that Blackmun contends, with respect to the argument of the
District Court of the State of Texas, that the woman's right to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy might also be derived from the Ninth Amendment (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153). If that is possible, it also opens the door to asserting the unborn's right to life,
as long as it is recognized to have the status of "human."
84. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222. Justice White's dissent in this case was joined
by Justice Rehnquist, and a note indicates that White's dissent in Doe v. Bolton also applies
to the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. See Doe v. Bolton at 221.
85. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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person who is therefore endowed with a corresponding right to life.
Evangelium Vitae also takes up this line of thought.
There are, however, strategies favoring a broad legalization of abortion
that are founded on the attempt to abolish the recognition of the unborn as
a person. The first strategy consists in distinguishing between "human
individual" and "human person." The second is that of declaring irrelevant,
legally as well as politically, the question of the "personhood" of the
unborn. The third is to avoid such discussions by appealing solely to a
woman's right to self-determination.
A. The Problem of Democracy
Allow me to digress briefly. The text of Evangelium Vitae could give
rise to the impression that abortion is a question arising exclusively in
democracies. In some sections, especially numbers 67'and 70, the
encyclical seems ultimately to be identifying the problem of abortion with
the power of democracies to decide anything arbitrarily, based on the will
of the majority. The truths included in these passages seem to be taken for
granted. They cannot, however, be interpreted to mean that democratic
mechanisms favor the legalization and promotion of abortion. Even if this
were the correct interpretation of these sections, this opinion would be
difficult to defend empirically, because communist dictatorships were among
the first nations to liberalize abortion, providing for its support with the
assistance of the state.
In the United States, abortion was liberalized by a decision of a
court-with more of an aristocratic, rather than democratic, character-that
opposed an antiabortion law passed by a democratically elected legislature.
The decision in Roe v. Wade did not represent the outcome of a
majoritarian vote, but instead gave into the claims of what was at the time
only a minority in American society. Furthermore, even the parliaments that
have liberalized abortion in other countries are representative institutions,
and their democratic legitimacy is not always clear. In this respect, the case
of Switzerland is significant, where in the 1970s the people voted on a
proposal to liberalize abortion in the first three months of pregnancy, and
a majority rejected it. (An attempt to insert a definition of the beginning of
human life in the Swiss constitution was, however, unsuccessful.) Such a
definition was included in the Irish constitution, by a majority vote. In
Poland, democratization meant also a revocation of the liberalized abortion
that existed under the communist regime. Thus, it is not clear on what
empirical facts one could maintain that democracy, in a special way, favors
the introduction of legal abortion. Given certain cultural presuppositions,
a democracy is capable of introducing and permitting abortion, as is every
other form of government. (It would be more difficult to have abortion on
demand if there were a "Catholic" dictatorship or monarchy, but is that form
of government really desirable?)
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At present, we are clearly facing a widening of the "culture of death,"
which is advancing at the same pace as the diffusion of democracy. This,
however, is not the point, and we would be blind to maintain it in the face
of the real problems of society, culture, people, and public opinion.More than democracy, the real problem seems to be that represented by
the institutions of the mass media, which are biased in this area. Even if
their freedom is one of the great values of a democracy and represents a
significant victory of democracy, they do not present themselves as
subordinated to democratic control. This is, nevertheless, the price one must
pay for the existence of an authentic and free public opinion, formed only
in a climate of liberty. If a dictatorship were to permit the formation and
articulation of public opinion (which normally would not occur), once it is
subject to the pressure of the latter, the dictatorship would give in-much
more easily than a democracy-to the temptation to liberalize abortion. Yet
dictatorships are also prone to call for plebiscites (when they consider them
convenient), premised on a majoritarian, but not democratic, logic (because
they exclude a free process for the formation of public opinion and, in
addition, offer no alternative in the vote itself). It is therefore not democra-
cy that constitutes the problem, but the mechanisms and persons that form
public opinion. It is not a question that depends on democratic institutions
as such, but of human and cultural formation. In sum, the problem of the
"culture of death" is not caused by political institutions, but reflects a
problem of the society, and only indirectly becomes also a problem having
to do with the institutions of the state and democracy. This is certainly one
of the most important messages of Evangelium Vitae.
B. The Strategy of Distinguishing between a "Human Individual" and a
"Human Person"
As we have seen, a fundamental premise for the legal defense of the life
of the unborn in a constitutional democracy is recognizing that the unborn,
in an embryonic as well as fetal state (and, by analogy, the physically or
mentally impaired, no less than the person in an irreversible coma) must be
considered human beings before the law, as much as any other human who
is already born. This principle is one of the explicit premises of the German
constitutional case law; by contrast, in Roe v. Wade the principle was
supposedly "bracketed" by Blackmun, but its denial constituted the main
premise of the decision. Given the present day scientific knowledge of
genetics and embryology, no one today can reasonably deny that an
individual formed by the fusion of gametes coming from individuals of the
species homo sapiens is also of the species homo sapiens-an individual
who needs nothing else to be defined as "human."
The first strategy for rendering this fact innocuous or irrelevant is the
theory according to which the human fetus-and a fortiori the em-
bryo-may be an individual belonging to the species homo sapiens but is
not yet a person. According to this strategy, a "person" can be defined only
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as a being endowed with a sufficiently developed self-awareness to have the
desire and/or interest to survive, and therefore a corresponding right to life.
This theory is thus based on the idea that every right corresponds to a
subjective interest, one that is consciously formed by the holder of that
right. The concept of a "person" is profoundly altered: "being a person"
is reduced to a property of an individual of the human species that appears
to begin only at a certain interval after birth and that can be lost during the
course of life.8
This is evidently an idea imbued with strong anthropological-philosophi-
cal implications." It can thus also be refuted with relative ease. 8 The
theory nonetheless has the advantage of a certain intuitive plausibility based
on the imprecise character of expressions such as "the fetus is not a person
in the full sense," or "it is potentially a person" or "a potential person." We
have already seen that this lack of precision was present in Justice
Blackmun's opinion. In fact, there are no such things as '"potential
persons," just as there are no individuals who are "potential birds" (but there
are gametes that potentially can become human persons, although the
gametes themselves do not constitute an individual of the human species).
The fetus is not a potential person but an actual human 'person, with
potentialities not yet developed. The fact of having such potentialities,
which later will be actualized, shows precisely that it is not a question of
development "toward being a human" but development "of a human being."
Therefore, the distinction between "being human" and "being a person"
implies that being considered a human or a human person, with correspond-
ing rights, depends on factors other than the mere fact of belonging to the
species homo sapiens (to affirm the latter would be "speciesism"), such as
self-awareness and the capacity to have permanent and future-oriented
desires. This means that a human being who has not yet reached this stage
86. Some of the most notable representatives of this view are Peter Singer, Practical
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Mary Anne Warren, "On the Moral
and Legal Status of Abortion," The Monist 57 (1973) 43; Michael Tooley, Abortion and
Infanticide (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); N. Hoerster, Abtreibung im stwularen Staat.
Argumente gegen den §218, (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991). See also Steinbock, Life
Before Birth.
87. See R. Spaemann, "Sind alle Menschen Personen? Ober neue philosophische
Rechtfertigungen der Lebensvemichtung," in J.P. Stassel, Tuchtigoder tot. Die Entsorgung
des Leidens(Freiburg/Br.: Herder, 199 l),133-147 (This article is also found, slightly revised,
in the volume edited by Thomas and Kluth, cited above in note 43); L. Honnefelder, "Der
Streit um die Person in der Ethik," PhilosophischesJahrbuch 100 (1993) 246-5.
88. I refer to G. P61tner, "Achtung der Wfirde und Schutz von Interessen," in J. Bonnelli,
ed., Der Mensch als Mitte und Mafistab der Medizin (Medizin und Ethik Bd. 1), (Wien -
New York: Springer Verlag, 1992), 3-32; S. Schwarz, The Moral Question of Abortion;
Martin Rhonheimer, Absolute Herrschaft der Geborenen? Anatomie und Kritik der
Argumentation von Norbert Hoersters Abtreibung im sikularen Staat (Wien: IMABE,
1995) (IMABE-Studie No. 5).
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(or who has lapsed from it in a manner presumed to be definitive) can be
killed for any reason, without any justification before the law.
C. The Strategy of Separating the Right to Life from the Intrinsic and
Specific Value of Human Life
A second strategy that tries to immunize against recognition of the fact
that the unborn is a human person consists in an affirmation of the necessity
of distinguishing the question of the status of the unborn (and thus possible
right to life) from the question of the intrinsic value or "sacredness" of life.
This is Ronald Dworkin's central thesis.8 9 Dworkin argues that one can
be opposed to abortion and require the pro-life intervention of the state for
two reasons: either for a "derivative" reason-that is, because one thinks
that the unborn child is a human person with a right to life, from which is
derived the responsibility (including that of the state) to protect the fetus-or
for a "detached" reason, not otherwise derived, but simply founded on the
conviction that human life, as such, possesses an intrinsic and sacred, even
if intangible, value from which springs an obligation-to be assumed by the
state-to protect that life."
Dworkin asserts that in reality the question of the personhood of the fetus
and the related right to life do not and could not represent the core of the
question, even within the scope of the Catholic tradition.9 Thus, accord-
ing to him, it is not crucial to determine when the existence of a human
begins. Dworkin denies that the unborn can be considered a "constitutional
person," and thus defends the decision in Roe v. Wade. He nonetheless
submits that the real reason why some show a propensity either for or
against abortion comes from a different evaluation of the intrinsic value, or
"sacredness," of human life. This evaluation depends on premises that are
ideological, religious, and theological, concerning which there exist a
plurality of opinions-very subjective ones, moreover-that in a pluralistic
society are not susceptible to regulation in a uniform manner for all. It
would be unjust, writes Dworkin, to impose on all citizens the opinions of
the majority regarding the intrinsic value of human life. We may be able
to arrive nevertheless at a peaceful compromise, precisely because it is
possible to bracket, as irrelevant, the question of whether the unborn is, or
is not, a person endowed with a corresponding right to life. Proposing with
admirable ability an interpretation of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
founded on "freezing" the question of the status of the unborn, Dworkin
89. Dworkin, Life's Dominion.
90. Ibid., 11.
91. Ibid., 39-50. Obviously, this assertion is not wrong, but it is banal, since the framing
of the issue in terms of "rights" is specifically modem. It is, however, quite typical of the
"Catholic position" on the subject to identify an essential connection between the intrinsic
value-sacredness--of human life and the right to life of every living human. Evangelium
Vitae affirms this from the beginning, in section 2.
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succeeds in conferring juridical logic on a legal situation that is, in reality,
profoundly contradictory.
Nevertheless, this position has two implications that are unacceptable:
(1) To deny the right to life (and the corresponding legal protection) of
certain living beings it is not important to know whether they are persons
or not, and thus also whether they are the holders of a right to life.
Dworkin's position is in any event incompatible with that of Warren, Singer,
Tooley, and Hoerster, which are based on a certainty that the unborn is not
a person and consequently lacks any right to life. For Dworkin, instead, it
is enough that it not be considered a person under positive law.
(2) In Dworkin's theory, enjoying a right to life, on the one hand, and
admitting the "sacredness of life" to be a good that is indispensable for man,
on the other, appear to be two different realities, lacking any relationship
between them. Here, then, is the crux. On the basis of that premise, the
legal recognition of the person (that is, whomever the law and the
constitution recognize as such) has no foundation other than the same
recognition on the part ofpositive law and also, therefore, on the part of the
majority vote that sanctioned its enactment.
The "right to life" of whoever is a "human person" according to an
explicit legal or constitutional recognition would not, in accordance with the
implication in point (1), depend therefore on some fact that transcends the
law itself, but precisely and only on the fact that the law established it. It
is thus a question of a complete separation of the two types of morality: a
"pre-legal," pre-politic al and private morality (to be politically bracketed)
and a legal, political, and public morality (independent of the first). In
accordance with the implication in point (2), such a right would not depend
on any property intrinsic to human life, either, but again only on positive
law to the extent that the latter establishes what is relevant and normative
for "public morality."
In the case of Dworkin, who in principle does not want to be, and is not
in any real sense, a representative of legal positivism," such an extreme
positivist attitude is surprising. I do not believe that Dworkin, a jurist,
followed the logic of his argument. Otherwise, he would certainly have
realized that his fundamental legal-political formula, the demand for "equal
concern and respect," requires a foundation able to demonstrate why concern
and respect are due to the human person. In truth, the argument that
establishes the value to which equality refers must precede the argument in
favor of equality. Equality is always a value relative to a substantive value
such as life or liberty.93
92. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, especially chapters 1-3. Clearly, neither
Dworkin's opposition to "originalist" theories, nor his choice to see the Constitution not as
a collection of detailed rules so much as moral principles to be constantly reinterpreted, seem
positivist; see Life's Dominion, 119 ff.
93. Agnes Heller, Beyond Justice (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 120 if.; 154.
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It is not possible that the foundation of the value of respect is the same
law that is supposed to guarantee its equality; in that case, it would not be
a foundation at all. It is thus not possible that there is no relationship at all
between being the holder of an equal right to life on the one hand, and the
intrinsic value of human life, on the other. In this way, a large part of
Dworkin's argument fails.
D. The Strategy of Appealing to a Woman 's Self-Determination
The third strategy, which is linked to certain strands of contemporary
feminism, is perhaps the most widespread, and it consists in deference to a
woman's right to self-determination. It would be a morally as well as
legally reasonable position if the unborn is not a human person with a right
to live. Even Singer and Hoerster explicitly admit that if the contrary were
true, an appeal to women's self-determination could not claim any legal
validity.94 Note, however, that this claim is not usually based on an
explicit assertion that the fetus is not a person with a right to live,9 but it
simply'-and thus in a very emotional way-claims the woman's right to
self-determination, without regard to a possible right of one who has no
voice, who is not visible, and who cannot defend himself or herself.
Even if there are really cases of grave and even tragic conflice 6-which
should be resolved with love and solidarity, without leaving the pregnant
woman alone-the demand for the woman's self-determination has a
different justification. It is intrinsically united with a lifestyle that interprets
sexuality as lacking any relationship to the purpose of transmitting human
life and thus to the corresponding responsibilities of parenthood. But every
pregnancy is the fruit of a sexual act, ordinarily freely chosen or consented
to. In this context, the existence of a new life, a pregnancy with the
consequent expectation of the birth of a child, is considered to be a threat
to one's own liberty (this also arises, analogously, when faced with relatives
who may be old, suffering, and in need of intensive care). Its growing
cultural predominance, based on a claim of "self-determination" together
with a profound crisis in female identity, constitutes a radical threat to
society.97
94. The arguments of N. Hoerster in Abtreibungim sWikularenStaat, 26-54, based on the
conviction that the fetus has a right to life, conclude that only a diagnosis of danger to the
life of the mother would be justified on those premises. Only later does he abandon this
premise, inasmuch as it is based on "speciesism." I think that the position of Hoerster (a
jurist) and others is really the only coherent position contrary to the "Catholic" one.
95. It is a matter of what A. Leist defines as an Umgehungsstrategie (a strategy of
avoidance); see Leist, EineFrage des Lebens, 32 ff.
96. Cf. Evangelium Vitae, 58.
97. Cf. Evangelium Vitae, 13. On the nexus between procreative irresponsibility, the
contraceptive mentality, and abortion, see also Martin Rhonheimer, Sexualitdt und
Verantwortung. Empfldngnisverhatung als ethisches Problem, (Wien: IMABE, 1995),
(IMABE Studie No. 3) especially 115 if. This book is a revised and expanded version of my
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Politically, this position finds support in a "protoliberal" attitude, which
is incapable of identifying in fundamental rights anything other than rights
of liberty to be asserted against the state and the risks arising from an abuse
of state power. We have seen how German constitutional jurisprudence
some time ago overcame this imperfect concept in its first decision relating
to a proposal to liberalize abortion. There, rightly, the protection of the life
of the unborn when threatened by third parties-exactly what the "proto-
liberal" insists is an illegitimate intervention of the state-was confirmed as
a duty of the state.
We come across a strange coalition, therefore, which invokes an account
of the woman's right to self-determination, an account that is protoliberal
in its understanding of fundamental rights and which has been superseded
by the development of the institutions of the liberal tradition. Such an
argument is founded on two premises, both of which are incorrect-one
from a jurisprudential point of view, and the other for biological-anthropo-
logical reasons provided by modem science.
VII. THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF LIFE AND
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CIVIL LAW AND MORAL LAW
A. The Argument of Evangelium Vitae
If these three strategies-partly incompatible with one another-turned
out to be true, or if they could really be included in constitutional law, our
culture of human rights would undergo a profound, if not actually perverse,
transformation.
This is just what Evangelium Vitae seems to want to demonstrate in one
of its fundamental passages. The encyclical gives two reasons that show the
incompatibility between a legal-political culture based on respect for human
rights and one founded on a general consent to abortion, as well as real
euthanasia (identifiable on the basis of acts or omissions based on an
intention to cut short, in the patient's interest, a life no longer considered
worthy of being lived). The first turns on the idea of equality before the
law: "laws which legitimize the direct killing of innocent human beings...
are in complete opposition to the inviolable right to life proper to every
individual; they thus deny the equality of everyone before the law." 8
The second reason springs from what we might call the "non-
disposability" of life, a principle which is also harmed through the
legalization of the suicide-homicide of euthanasia (understood here as
procuring death with the assistance of a doctor, it is another question
whether suicide as such should be punished or given support). The reason
article "Contraception, Sexual Behavior, and Natural Law: Philosophical Foundation of the
Norm of Humanae Vitae," The Linacre Quarterly 56 (1989) 20-57.
98. Evangelium Vitae, 72.
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is clear: "In this way the State contributes to lessening respect for life and
opens the door to ways of acting which are destructive of trust in relations
between people."
Finally, the encyclical explains that the political reason that makes this
question important is not merely the good of the individual (inasmuch as
that is not necessarily enough to prompt the intervention of the state):
Laws which authorize and promote abortion and euthanasia are therefore
radically opposed not only to the good of the individual but also to the
common good; as such they are completely lacking in authentic juridical
validity. Disregard for the right to life, precisely because it leads to the
killing of the person whom society exists to serve, is what most directly
conflicts with the possibility of achieving the common good. Conse-
quently, a civil law authorizing abortion or euthanasia ceases by that very
fact to be a true, morally binding civil law."°
In the final paragraph of the main text, before the "Conclusion," the
encyclical even says:
Only respect for life can be the foundation and guarantee of the most
precious and essential goods of society, such as democracy and peace.
There can be no true democracy without a recognition of every person's
dignity and without respect for his or her rights. Nor can there be true
peace unless life is defended and promoted.'
These texts show, above all, how the Magisterium has adhered to, and
even appropriated for its own, a legal-political type of argument. The
encyclical confirms the incongruence, with respect to the common good, of
legislation favoring abortion and euthanasia, a contradiction that reveals
itself in the specific and peculiar reason that such legislation originates in
a society (including political society) that is oriented toward "the service of
the person" and that, consequently, cannot contemplate a legal norm
declaring it legal to kill an innocent person (or one that does not condemn
it by a legitimate judge and a punishable crime under positive law).
Moreover, the encyclical mentions, among the fundamental goods of
social life threatened by a culture of death, equality of all before the law,
respect for life, and trust in relations between people. Finally, Evangelium
Vitae affirms that authentic democracy and peace are impossible where life
is not respected.
To be sure, the text needs further specification in some places. In
particular, it is not at all clear what it means to assert, in this context, that
a law instituting abortion is not "morally binding," since such a law does





certain actions. The assertion could be understood to mean that such a law
is contrary to the morality that citizens in legislative and judicial institutions
are bound to follow insofar as they are the authors of acts of public
relevance (e.g. legislative acts), that is, which are of interest to the civil
society as a whole. Moreover, in this context it is important to clarify the
difference between the "decriminalization" ("de-penalization") of certain acts
(Tatbestandsausschluss) and their "legalization" or "justification"
(Rechtfertigung). To fail to intervene with the criminal law is not obviously
the equivalent, in certain cases, of declaring specific acts to be "legal"
(rechtmassig) or legally justifying them, especially because, in the latter
case, it will also be possible to have recourse to public support through the
health system and the supporting community that maintains health insurance
financing for such acts. It could even be possible to impose on health
personnel an obligation to offer the corresponding services. " It is also
important to emphasize, however, the large social and psychological
difference between abrogating an existing penalty on the one hand, and not
introducing a penalty that never before existed, on the other.
The only justifiable case foreseeable by juridical logic in which abortion
could be declared legal, that is, in accordance with the law, is an interfer-
ence with the right to life of the unborn in order to save the life of the
mother. In fact, here there are two juridical goods at stake, which in
constitutional terms are equivalent and thus offer the possibility of
juridically justifying such an interference."
It remains to consider why the legal advancement of abortion and
euthanasia entails the steady abolition of equality before the law, trust in
relations between people, and, ultimately, democracy and peace. At this
level, we encounter the connection between civil law and moral law: the
"culture of death" is contrary to the moral premises of the social order and
of the legal-political culture of the constitutional democratic state.
102. Even if it can be imagined, it is highly problematic to declare an act illegal without
arranging for a corresponding sanction provided by criminal law. This is what the German
Constitutional Court proposed in its secondjudgment of 1993, and the proposal would mean
that an action is illegal and permitted at the same time. See W. Kluth, "Der rechtswidrige
Schwangerschafisabbruch als erlaubte Handlung," Zeitschrift far das gesamte Familien-
recht 1993 (Heft 12) 1382-1390.
103. We should not forget that all fundamental rights are valid with reservations
determined by the existence of a law that may restrict them (Gesetzesvorbehalt). Thus even
Article 2, Section 2 of the Grundgesetz provides that it is only possible to interfere with the
right to life on the basis of a law. At the same time, however, Article 19, Section 2 provides
that no fundamental right can be impaired in its "essential content" (Wesensgehalt); homicide
would be such an example. Juridically, however, one could choose to balance it against the
life of the mother-a path which is not practicable from a strictly moral point of view-given
that it is not the state's role to oblige men to behave with moral rectitude, but instead to
protect human life according to the principle of equality before the law. Obviously, no
public authority, on the basis of such a balancing, can be permitted to force anyone to abort.
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B. Civil Law and Moral Law: The Moral Premises of Democratic
Constitutionalism
In the course of our inquiry we have asked ourselves, more than once,
how to justify the protection of prenatal life within a political culture based
on a more or less Hobbesian-type utilitarian calculation. Within that sphere,
those who submit to the coercive power of a state renounce part of their
liberty in order to gain thereby a civil liberty, which includes security,
peace, and the possibility of prosperity. We have seen how fundamental this
logic is in the search for a guarantee of civil liberty; it is needed to justify
the state's juridical duty to protect basic rights threatened by third parties
and thus to show that such rights are a defense not only against the state.
What is more, such rights serve to guarantee certain basic values, the
protection of which defines the elementary task of state authority:
protecting everyone's life and guaranteeing their security.
It is evident that this is a powerful argument on which to base any state
law that prohibits homicide and punishes the guilty man for the killing of
the another. Without such a law, human coexistence would be impossible.
The state could no longer fulfill its most elementary functions. The link
between protection and obedience would be broken. But how would the
unborn fall within this? Even a law that establishes a right to kill embryos
and fetuses does not yet represent any threat to citizens. Thus, Peter Singer,
not without a measure of cynicism, quotes Bentham's noted remark,
according to which "infanticide is not capable of stealing tranquillity even
from the most fearful soul," adding that "once we are old enough to
understand this policy we are already too big to feel threatened by it."''"
The logical structure of the "strategies" outlined above nonetheless
demonstrate that legislative demands in favor of abortion and euthanasia
contradict the foundations of a democratic culture and of a state engaged in
guaranteeing security and peace to its citizens.
(1) Moral Premises of the Culture of Death
We need to bear in mind that the proposals of a culture of death are
ruinous not just because of what they propose. They are also destructive
because their acceptance excludes alternatives, which can even be erased
from memory. The culture of death is an alternative to that of solidarity,
of unconditional respect for life, of the permanent willingness of those who
are living and strong and endowed with greater capacity for achievement to
renounce certain advantages and rights in favor of others who are defense-
less, weak, and needy. As the encyclical declares, such a "culture which
denies solidarity"' 5 is based on a "notion of freedom which exalts the
104. Singer, Practical Ethics, chapter six, 170; cited according to the German edition
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 1984).
105. Evangelium Vitae, 12.
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isolated individual in an absolute way, and gives no place to solidarity, to
openness to others and service to them.'
' °
The "culture of death" represents not only the alternative to a civilization
of love, but also to a civilization of profound respect for one's neighbor
based on the simple affirmation that one finds oneself before another human
being. We have confirmation of this when the handicapped are insulted and
even physically assaulted by other citizens who reprimand them for being
public burdens, or When parents of a handicapped child are seemingly
disliked because it is thought that they have-irresponsibly--committed the
error of not having chosen abortion at the appropriate time. The ethic of the
value of life strongly contrasts with that promoted by the supporters of
infanticide as a form of "mercy killing,"' 7 who assert that "life is not a
good in itself, but a means to something else-for example, to reach
pleasant states of consciousness."'08
This places in doubt what we commonly define as "human dignity" and
the dignity of human life in general, given that human life-and thus the
existence of the individual person-becomes a mere means for values
connected to life, reducing life to an instrument to attain those goods. Here
it is unnecessary to take up a discussion of this central point; it is sufficient
to show that in the end the aforementioned strategies are oriented toward
eliminating from our culture and our most deeply rooted convictions the
truth expressed by Kant in a crucial moment of modem history: that a
human being has no price, but dignity; and that he can never be treated as
a mere means, but always also as an end. This truth is the heritage of a
civilization, which originated in Christianity.
(2) Juridical Premises of the Culture of Death
Furthermore, according to the strategies outlined above, our legal system
ought to recognize a series of principles such as the following (not
necessarily all of them together, however, given that they are in part
logically incompatible):
(1) Being considered a human, or a human person, with corresponding
rights, depends on factors other than the mere fact of belonging to the
species homo sapiens. That is, it depends on specific properties and
capacities that an individual human may or may not possess, and that may
be lost even during an individual's life. It is the task of society (that is,
philosophers, biologists, jurists and others) to determine what properties are
capable of providing a foundation for the right to life and, accordingly, of
defining who is a person. Obviously, it is not possible to be certain that this
106. Ibid., 19.
107. H. Kuhse and P. Singer, Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped
Infants (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
108. H. Kuhse, The Sanctity-of-LifeDoctrine in Medicine: A Critique (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1987), 213.
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process will remain immune from the influence of the specific interests of
those who affect such a determination;
(2) The intrinsic value of human life, its dignity and sacredness, has no
relation at all with those possible "rights" that ought to be connected with
that life (from this principle the next one follows);
(3) It is the role of the positive law alone to determine who, by law, may
be considered a "person," and therefore who is the object of equal treatment
before the law; that is to say, independently of biological and anthropologi-
cal facts, which are generally considered to be morally irrelevant. In
contrast to the first principle, this third one would allow only politicians,
legislators, and judges to determine who can be recognized as a person with
a right to equal treatment on the part of the law (in practice, however, it has
an identical effect);
(4) Any possible limit to the self-determination of a subject (for
example, a pregnant woman) justifies the elimination of the cause of that
limit, assuming that that cause is not, in turn, already a subject with a
present capacity for self-determination (something not possible for the
unborn, or persons in an irreversible coma, or even the elderly in need of
intensive care without hope of recovery).
No one would desire, in my opinion, a society and a legal system based
on such principles. On the contrary, we take pride precisely in having
overcome, in our legal-political culture, a similar danger. Nevertheless,
perhaps this aversion survives only at an intuitive level. I shall now propose
two basic arguments to make these intuitions, which are correct, more
rationally explicit. Both of the arguments are based on the premise that the
unborn is, as is every human, an individual belonging to the species homo
sapiens, and is thus a human person (since the existence of such individuals,
except insofar as they are persons, is not possible).
(3) The Pre-Political Character of the Right to Life and the Logic of
Discrimination.
Even remaining within Hobbesian logic, we must realize that the
fundamental right on which the entire subsequent edifice is built is the right
to life. For Hobbes, the primary and fundamental bonum is identified
precisely with life, survival, and self-preservation. The summum malum, in
contrast, is represented by violent and painful death, unnatural and
undesired, in frustration of one's self-interest.'
The critical point is that this right is not, even in Hobbesian thinling,
founded in a utilitarian way. On the contrary, the entire utilitarian calculus
that leads to the institution of state authority is placed in the service of "the
value of life." The right to live, for any man, is a presupposition for the
109. Hobbes, De Homine, XI, 6.
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legitimacy of any legal and civil order. Hobbes, in a radical way, under-
stands a threat to one's own life to be the sole but decisive reason for not
being obliged to submit to the sovereign, given that it is precisely the
sovereign who has been authorized to protect life.
The advantage of Hobbesian thought, in this context, is that it provides
a theory that formulates the minimum requirements for demonstrating a
common heritage of Western culture: the right to live is not conferred by
political power or by law. It is prior to them. Political society and the state
are always in the service of the life of every individual, acknowledging the
human dignity even of subjects who do not participate in the hypothetical
social contract, inasmuch as they are too weak to represent any threat to the
peaceful coexistence and prosperity of men (and who, moreover, make no
contribution whatsoever to others but instead constitute a burden on them,
a limitation on their liberty). If this is true, no utilitarian calculus can
justify respect for life. Here is where the principle of "human dignity"
comes into play, as a foundation for the unconditional respect for the other,
respect based simply on being human." °
It follows from this that one who is "human" but excluded from such
protection and security is discriminated against, because for whatever reason
he is not capable of consciously assuming the contractual bond holding
together the political community, or because his exclusion is sanctioned by
a majority. The first case applies to the unborn, and also concerns
newborns and children; the second, for example, is the case of blacks in the
United States until the latter half of the nineteenth century. It is a question
of discrimination because a "non-species" criterion of exclusion is applied,
that is, a criterion that differs from one that takes into account membership
in the species homo sapiens.
The important result of these reflections is that the utilitarianism of the
Hobbesian calculus-and afortiori of the Lockean and similar ones--cannot
relativize the right to life of every individual human; it is rather presupposed
as a pre-political right. Thus, this reasoning coincides with the idea that
there exists a level of "value"-that of life and security-which must be
respected by the legislator. As we have already discussed in connection
with Roe v. Wade, no legislator has ever conferred such a right on a
human; on the contrary, the legitimacy of legislative power-which is the
core of Hobbesian thought-depends on the effectiveness of the protection
110. This is the argument in Kriele, Die nicht-therapeutische Abtreibung vor dem
Grundgesetz, 95 ff. The category of "human dignity" obviously goes beyond Hobbesian
political theory. Nevertheless, in the Lockean version of contractualism, found in the
Declaration of Independence of the United States of 1776, we can find the formulation: "that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certaininalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among men . . ." (cf. Locke, Second Treatise of
Government, §§ 87; 94).
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of the life of the individual person. The only limitation that can even be
contemplated would be to restrict this to the innocent person, that is, one
who is not guilty of a crime that by law carries with it capital punishment.
Nevertheless, even in this case it was not the state that conferred the right
to live to anyone; it simply revoked it, but does so ad personam and
assumes a judgment for a crime for which the accused is found guilty. It
is not revoked, therefore, on the basis of a discriminatory law, but on the
basis of an individual judgment constitutive of guilt.
Certainly, the Hobbesian formulation is minimal, poor, and not free of
ambiguity, insofar as it reduces everything to mere survival. But in the
present context it is more than sufficient to show that the respect for life has
priority and is immune from every utilitarian calculus, even in so utilitarian
a thinker as Hobbes. Now we can also understand why, according to
Hobbes, the science of these terms of peace, or the precepts of reason that
lead to conditions of peace among men, represent in his opinion "the true
and only moral philosophy"; this is why Hobbes defines them as "natural
laws.""' Preserving and protecting human life because it is the life of a
man and "my life" is the fundamental point of convergence between moral
law and civil law.
With respect to the protection of legally enforceable rights, to allow a
criterion different from that of belonging to the species homo sapiens means
legitimizing discriminatory laws elsewhere as well. People are apt to
discriminate in this way, so long as it corresponds to the interest of an
"exclusive" majority-a majority able to protect itself in such a way as to
ensure that none of its members ever risks being counted among the
members of the class discriminated against. The unborn are surely the
prime candidates for such discrimination.
While racial, ethnic, religious, or social discrimination tends to become
attenuated and is gradually overcome (since those discriminated against
become historical actors who vindicate their rights), this is impossible in the
case of those who are not yet born. They find themselves in a situation of
total dependence on the born. Consequently, the initiative for respecting
their right to life is the duty only of those who potentially discriminate
against them. Thus we arrive at the second argument.
(4) The Golden Rule and the Sense of Justice
Granting that the unborn is a human person with a right to life, legalizing
abortion means favoring, with the support of state authority and the entire
society of the living, a weakening of the sense of justice. We shall be
required to become accustomed to violating the good of others-the same
good that, if it were our own, we would instead want respected by
others-as not contrary to the most elementary sense of justice, only because
111. Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter XV.
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we have nothing to fear from that other person: neither he nor any other
member of the "class "of the as yet unborn will ever be able to make us pay
for this injustice of ours.
Hobbes maintained that his theory of natural laws-which are the terms
of peace that lead to the agreement instituting the sovereign power of the
state-would be nothing more than a new formulation or a "succinct
formula" of the "law of the gospel," and in particular of the golden rule
contained therein: "do not do to others what you would not wish done to
you.""' It is here that Hobbes's theory seems insufficient, inasmuch as it
does not correspond at all to the logic of the golden rule but rather to what
Gregory Kavka has called the "copper rule" (which is less perfect and
bright): the principle "Do unto others as they do unto you." '1
The "golden rule," however, which commands us (not) to do unto others
what we would (not) want others to do unto us, is not based on the
expectation of an effective reciprocal behavior on the part of oth-
ers-impossible in the case of the unborn and in many other cases-but
only on the desirability of that behavior toward us. It is a question of a way
of behaving that-and here lies the essence of the principle of "jus-
tice"--becomes "for me" a norm of behavior "with respect to the other" and
"in the interests of the other."
'" 4
None of us, at present, would wish to have been aborted while in a fetal
state. Or better yet, no one would consider someone a benefactor who
decided at that time to terminate our nascent life. No one would even make
the following concession: "I cannot take issue with the behavior of that
person, given that at the time, I, not then being a person, did not have
interests and desires." On the contrary, if we were to find out about
someone who, at that time, attempted to perpetrate a similar act but failed,
we would be inclined to accuse him of attempted homicide before a court.
(This demonstrates that every aborted fetus, while not a "potential person"
but already a person in fact, is a potential actor. But being an actor in a
court is a property that the fetus only potentially possesses, which seems to
constitute a further reason for assigning to the state a duty to take up the
protection of the unborn."')
112. Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter XV. I refer, for this, to my book: La Filosofiapolitica
di Thomas Hobbes, 6.2 and 6.5.
113. Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986), 347.
114. M. Rhonheimer, Laprospettivadella morale. Fondamentidell'eticaflosofica,242
ff.
115. See M. Rhonheimer, Absolute Herrschaflder Geborenen?, 46 ff. A very similar
argument is that of H. J. Gensler, "The Golden Rule Argument Against Abortion," in Pojman
and Beckwith, The Abortion Controversy, 305-319.
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As emphasized, with reference to an argument by Richard M. Hare that
is equally founded on the golden rule," 6 every application of this funda-
mental rule of justice assumes an identity between the unborn (embryo or
fetus) and the person after birth."' It is true that various theories exist,
in the tradition of Locke's concept of "person," that attempt to contest that
identity, on the basis of the previously noted distinction between "person"
and "human individual.""' Nevertheless, we have no reason to think that
a fetus-say, this author at eight and a half months in my mother's womb,
visible in an ultrasound image-is not "me," or that the photograph that my
father took of an already smiling two-year-old is not my image, even if
there are some philosophers who would assert the opposite simply because,
they say, we cannot remember those "fetal" moments. It would follow that
that fetus was an individual other than the one I am now.
Each one of us would perceive it as intrinsically unjust to imagine our
own abortion committed on the basis of the argument that this human
individual did not yet enjoy that right to life which is now ascribed to him,
having been born and thus having acquired the rights of a citizen; or that he
unfortunately was an obstacle to the self-determination of his mother and her
projects (or simply that he was the "unwanted" fruit of a sexual act with a
defective contraceptive); or that ultimately it was not so important whether
he was a person at the time since the law did not consider him a "constitu-
tional person" and since, in general, the state cannot impose on all citizens
the majority's notion of the value of life.
In sum, if we are disposed to cultivate the consciousness of having all
been, at one time, embryos and fetuses-clearly not aborted-perhaps we
will be in a position to recall that a state that does not consider itself bound
to protect those not yet born, and the society that absolves it of that duty,
are both founded on a grave injustice incompatible with the essence of law.
In a society where something that is manifestly a crime and where a
primordial violation of justice is converted into a "right" supported, planned,
and administered by the state," 9 interpersonal relations must inevitably
suffer serious damage, given that living together in society, a common good
par excellence, is based precisely on justice.
In order to qualify not only as the claims of persons but also as a genuine
legal order, law presumes that people act not only in light of their individual
good but also for the good of others because it is the good of the other,
seeking such a good not so much because it foreseeably results in the long
term in my own good, but because it is good for the other person. This
116. R.M. Hare, "Abortion and the Golden Rule," Philosophy and Public Affairs 4
(1975) 201-22.
117. A. Leist, Eine Frage des Lebens, 103 if.
118. See Spaemann, Sind alle Menschen Personen?, and Honnefelder, Der Streit um die
Person.
119. Cf. Evangelium Vitae, 11.
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basic solidarity in seeking not just the "good for me" but also the good of
the other, because it is good for the other, reflects the profundity of the
golden rule, which is founded on the recognition that the other is a human
being as much as I am. This is what we could define as "willful self-
transcendence of the subject with respect to the other," which is just what
Hobbesian philosophy ends up denying. 20 All of social life is based on
this self-transcendence of the person with respect to the other. The logic of
"collective advantage," in compensation for the mutual exchange of
renunciations of "natural" liberty, is insufficient. The reason for conferring
the monopoly of legitimate violence on a sovereign power does not,
therefore, contain the whole truth. 2' It can be the basis for the logic of
security, but not at the same time for that of living together in society, of
interpersonal community, or of mutual trust. If it could be attributed only
to propter retributionem, it would correspond to "economic," rather than
genuinely moral, behavior.22
In short, the Hobbesian calculus-and any contractualism of a utilitarian
type-is only able to provide the basis for the state's obligation to protect
my life, but not my obligation to respect and protect also the life of others,
except insofar as I can foreseeably benefit from it. Thus Hobbes is not
capable of providing a basis for solidarity, but only for a calculus directed
toward one's own benefit (in the long term).
The mere logic of mutual benefit or "collective advantage" is always
open to excluding and discriminating against entire groups from its
calculations. It is insufficient for founding an unconditional respect for the
other as my equal-unconditioned, that is, by factors such as "not being
born," "mentally infirm," "object of heavy treatments that force others to
make serious sacrifices." It cannot be denied, however, that true peace and
the values of democracy take root at just this level, where moral law and
civil law interpenetrate in a fundamental way. I have argued from the outset
that the immoral character of a certain way of acting does not constitute a
sufficient reason for it being prohibited and suppressed on the part of the
civil law and the coercive power of public authority. Nevertheless, once we
make clear the connection between the immorality (or, more accurately, the
injustice) of the action in question and the common good, understood in
terms of specific political ethics, the way is opened for a legal-political
argument able to provide the basis for a corresponding intervention of the
120. ".... the necessity of nature leads men to will and desire the bonum sibi, that which
is good for themselves...": Hobbes, Elements of Law Natural and Political, I, chap. 14,
6. The search for the good (and right) of others enters into Hobbesian philosophy only as
a result of a utilitarian calculus.
121. This is admitted, without offering a solution to the problem, by 0. Hdffe in
Politische Gerechtigkeit. Grundlegung einer kritischen Philosophie von Recht und Staat
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1989), 427.
122. See David L. Norton, Democracy and Moral Development: A Politics of Virtue
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991), 25-31.
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state and the legislator. This is what we have done in these pages,
demonstrating that it is a line of argument akin to the one in Evangelium
Vitae.
VIII. CONCLUSION
State authority and the law are not capable of creating society. They are,
however, capable of protecting-or of destroying by means of an irresponsi-
ble passivity and tolerance-those premises which are essential for life in
society, such as that of the respect for the life of every living individual who
belongs to the human species. We are at present in a very peculiar
situation. Compared to other eras, we know more and we can also do much
more. We can kill better, in simpler and more painless ways. We also
know much more about prenatal life. We are aware that the life of an
individual human being-concretely, this or that person-already began
even before the mother realized that she was pregnant. Furthermore, we
have a knowledge of prenatal life and associated techniques that allow us to
do what must not be done, and what is-at least up to now-against the law
to do after birth. The weight of our responsibility has increased, sometimes
in a way that makes it almost unbearable to resist the corresponding
temptations. Nevertheless, modem man has a responsibility for life that is
much more extensive with respect to that of every preceding generation.
We must learn to assume that responsibility in accordance with our human
dignity.
In Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II speaks of a "cultural change," in which
what he calls a "new feminism," founded on a new sensitivity with respect
to the "experience of motherhood," will have a preeminent role. In
particular, the encyclical affirms that which seems to be almost a synthesis
of what has been said up to this point, namely, that motherhood is a sort of
"school of humanity":
A mother welcomes and carries in herself another human being, enabling
it to grow inside her, giving it room, respecting it in its othemess.
Women first learn and then teach others that human relations are
authentic if they are open to accepting the other person: a person who
is recognized and loved because of the dignity which comes from being
a person and not from other considerations, such as usefulness, strength,
intelligence, beauty, or health. This is the fundamental contribution
which the Church and humanity expect from women. And it is the
indispensable prerequisite for an authentic cultural change.' 23
We would be blind if we did not see that here is the core of the problem.
A new feminism, however, need not reproduce a simple return to forms of
disrespect toward women that are typical of a society saturated in a one-
123. Evangelium Vitae, 99.
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sided way with masculine values. The drama of abortion is a drama caused
in large part by men. In this sense, also, the cultural change concerns
everyone, engages everyone, and depends on everyone.

